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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) on
informational privacy under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as it relates
to searches of technology in the context of criminal investigations. The development and use of
technology in criminal investigations will be detailed along with an overview of the current state
of the law in this area. Challenges with the interpretation of section 8 demonstrate a prevalent
uncertainty. This thesis proposes a new approach for the SCC to apply to cases where technology
intersects with section 8 of the Charter. The proposal rests on a clearer and broader understanding
of privacy along with measurable categories for more predictable outcomes.

v

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement in Canada are tasked with preventing and investigating crime.1

To

investigate crime, police regularly use a variety of tools including the common practices of
conducting physical surveillance and gathering intelligence from confidential informants. The use
of technology in criminal investigations is a relatively new and quickly developing phenomenon.
In some cases, technology is employed by criminals specifically to avoid police detection. The
use of cryptocurrencies to hide the profits of crime and anonymous online websites or services to
conduct criminal transactions are examples of this. More commonly, technology is a collateral
part of a criminal investigation. For example, because of technological developments child
pornography is now accessible through the internet. Drug and weapons trafficking arrangements
are made via text messages on smart phones. Today more crimes are inadvertently leaving behind
digital data in the form of IP addresses, search history or electronic records of the criminal
activities. In the same way technology provides criminals with the means and method to commit
crimes, it can provide vast amounts of specific and accurate information about their activities that
would assist law enforcement in their investigations.
Law enforcement would like to have access to this digital evidence in every case but there
are restrictions to their ability to search for and seize it. This limitation to police powers is
expressed in section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that
“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”2 Section 8 is used
to determine whether a search and/or seizure is lawful. To investigate and prosecute an accused

1

See for example RCMP, “About the RCMP” (May 7, 2018) online: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/indexeng.htm.
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
1

person with the aim of achieving a conviction, the police must have gathered the evidence lawfully
so that it is admissible at trial.
While the provision of section 8 itself is straightforward, the jurisprudence is not. The
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has dealt with the intersection of informational privacy and
technology on a variety of occasions over the past three decades. Accused persons have argued
before the SCC that they have had their right to privacy violated with respect to their movements
captured by a tracking device3, electricity consumption records obtained from a utility company4,
heat patterns in their home viewed through forward looking infrared technology5, child
pornography files on their home computer6 and work laptop7, and incriminating text messages
conversations.8 The Court has provided general principles to assist in the interpretation of section
8, specifically that it should be governed by a flexible and normative analysis.9 The Court has
identified the purpose of section 8 as to prevent unjustified state intrusion on individual privacy.10
They have created a variety of tools of analysis to achieve this purpose including the totality of the
circumstances test and the concept of a biographical core of information. Yet, the jurisprudence
from the SCC has not provided the desired certainty or predictability. Split decisions, caveats and
an ad hoc approach create confusion that leaves justice participants guessing where the Court will
fall on developing issues with emerging technology.

3

R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527, 11 CR (4th) 253 [Wise].
R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281, 24 CR (4th) 47 [Plant]; R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 SCR 211 [Gomboc].
5
R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 SCR 432 [Tessling].
6
R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 SCR 253 [Morelli].
7
R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 SCR 34 [Cole].
8
R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 SCR 621 [Fearon]; R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 SCR 608 [Marakah];
R v Jones, 2017 SCC 60, [2017] 2 SCR 696 [Jones].
9
Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145,
11 DLR (4th) 641 [Hunter v Southam], paras 16, 18-19 and 26; see also Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian
Criminal Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) [Stuart], page 290.
10
Hunter v Southam, paras 25 and 27.
4

2

The practical problems at the root of the section 8 analysis can be seen in the recent case
of R v Mills.11 In Mills, a police officer created a fictitious Facebook profile appearing as a 14year-old girl, “Leann Power”. Over the course of two months Sean Mills, a 31-year old man,
communicated with Leann through thousands of messages on the social media platform, some
being overly sexual in nature, which police captured using an online tool called Snag-It.12 Mills
was charged with four counts of child luring contrary to the Criminal Code.13 Mills alleged that
the search was an unreasonable violation of his privacy.14 The Crown said it was not and sought
to use the messages seized from Facebook as evidence to secure his conviction. This case involved
technology being used in the commission of the crime and raises the question of when and how
technology can be used by the police to investigate crime and when they can lawfully seize the
digital evidence.
Mills is not an isolated case. Police are constantly faced with technological opportunities
that would significantly assist in their investigations. For example, if police know that a suspect
regularly wears a smart watch, Fitbit or owns a cellphone they know that there is data available
about that person’s exact whereabouts. If the suspect has smart devices in their home, such as a
smart fridge, security system or lightbulb, that data can be used to gather intelligence on the
person’s activities. For those who own a digital assistant, such as an Alexa or Echo, they actually
own a listening device that police could certainly use to gather information about the person’s life.
One would assume that people expect privacy in these devices and their information will be
reasonably protected from police access.

11

R v Mills, 2017 NLCA 12, [2017] 136 WCB (2d) 728 [Mills], leave to appeal of SCC granted.
Mills, SCC Factum of HMTQ, paras 13, 24 and 25.
13
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code], section 172.1(1).
14
Mills, SCC Factum of Sean Patrick Mills, para 1.
12

3

Protecting an individual’s privacy in technology from the State in the context of a criminal
investigation is complex. The central focus of this thesis is to answer the question: in the context
of criminal investigations, how can the line be drawn between lawful and unlawful searches of
technology in light of the jurisprudence on section 8 of the Charter? And, given the challenges
with the current jurisprudence, how should the law be modified to bring greater legal certainty?

1.1 METHODOLOGY
This thesis attempts to answer these questions using three approaches to legal analysis,
namely the doctrinal, historical and interdisciplinary methods.
Doctrinal
To understand informational privacy in the context of technology, I will review the case
law, legislation and arguments presented within section 8 litigation. This will be done using the
doctrinal method. The doctrinal method involves the analysis of existing legal doctrine through a
review of cases, statutes, rules and literature.15 Doctrinal research provides the means to describe
the legal context for this project and frame the issues surrounding informational privacy. Since
informational privacy is located within Charter jurisprudence, the Charter and case law from the
Supreme Court of Canada interpreting and applying section 8 will be a primary focus of this
project, specifically in chapters 3 and 4. Traditional texts, such as the Criminal Code and academic
writings will of course be reviewed. I will also canvass online blogs, news and main stream media

15

Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 17
Deakin LR 83.
4

writings to gain a wider range of perspectives. Foundational principles revealed from a doctrinal
review will be used in chapter 5 to build upon and frame a proposed new approach to section 8.
Historical
The historical method is concerned with tracing the history of a particular development
within the law and possibly as well its relationship to the history of society. 16 Historical method
finds the context of texts.17 Ideas rejected in the past may be relevant now and can perhaps be
used in today’s different set of circumstances.18 I will use a primarily internal legal history
approach, which is essentially historical doctrinal work.19 In reviewing the judgements from the
SCC, there are certainly ideas that were once prominent which have seemingly lost their
importance.20 I will use the historical method to set the stage for the reader and aim to learn lessons
from the past.
Within the case law, it is important to review the positions of the parties and the interveners
along with examining the judgments of the SCC in order to appreciate the significant differences
in the approaches to the issues and articulation of the potential impact of the Court’s decision.
Their viewpoints are influential to the judgments and demonstrate the fundamental divide on the
larger issue of online privacy. This internal history places the judgements in context to understand

16

Robert Cryer, et al. Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) [Cryer],
page 88.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid. See also Jim Phillips, “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41 VUWLR 293.
19
As opposed to external legal history which looks at context and sources outside the law.
20
For example, the idea that informational privacy protected the “biographical core” of individual’s information was
a staple of section 8 cases in the 1990s and early 2000s but has since seen a decline in its importance and relevance to
SCC’s decision making. See Chris Hunt and Micah Rankin, “R. v. Spencer: Anonymity, The Rule of Law, and the
Shriveling of the Biographical Core” (2015) 61 McGill L J 193 [“Shriveling of the Biographical Core”].
5

the legal landscape so that one can appropriately analyze the development of informational privacy
protections.
External historical method will be used in this project to study how privacy law has
developed since the Charter’s implementation and how technology has developed since the advent
of the internet. This is done to establish the “historico-political context” for legal arguments and
provide the “backdrop to judicial decisions”.21
While history will be relevant to framing this research by appreciating where the law is
today, I do not intend to focus on the history of section 8 of the Charter as the main theme for this
project. History is able to answer some questions, primarily contextual, but is limited in its ability
to address the forward looking and present problem of police searches of technology.
Interdisciplinary
Legal problems are in fact social, economic, political problems. Legal questions cannot
always be answered through the law alone.22 One type of interdisciplinary work is empirical.
Statistics can be used to get a holistic view of the field of law as part of a wider context. 23 I will
be referring to statistics in this project to demonstrate the size of the issue.24 With the use of social
media, the internet and the growing Internet of Things (IoTs), it will be useful to understand the
scope of the issue and the number of people directly affected by this project. To do this, I draw

21

Cryer, page 88.
Moti Nissani, “Ten Cheers for Interdisciplinarity: The Case for Interdisciplinary Knowledge and Research (1997)
34 Soc Sci J 201.
23
Cryer, pages 76-78.
24
For example, the number of Facebook users, Twitter accounts, Alexa’s sold in Canada, etc.
22
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upon empirical evidence to demonstrate the problem – i.e. billions of Facebook users, profits
realized by technology companies25 – which cannot be explored solely within the field of law.

1.2 THESIS LAYOUT
First this thesis examines how technology has become a valuable and desirable component
of many criminal investigations. I provide a brief history of technology then address the reality of
mass data collection and data breaches. I detail how technology acts as a scrupulous record keeper
and how all this data can be beneficial to police. I also discuss the potential for social media and
the IoTs to collect and provide relevant information.

Technology captures incriminating

information automatically, as a consequence of the use of an online service or device, but it can
also be used intentionally as a tool for committing crime. I provide examples of how technology
is used and how it is relevant to criminal investigations.
Chapter 3 outlines the development and current state of the law on section 8 of the Charter.
The SCC has interpreted section 8 of the Charter as requiring a normative inquiry, focusing on the
concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Early jurisprudence established that the task of
any section 8 analysis is to balance individual privacy interests with law enforcement efforts.26
This chapter introduces the reader to the sphere of informational privacy as articulated by the SCC
and two tools of analysis employed by the Court in these section 8 cases. In reviewing the tools

25

See David Kirkpatrick, The Facebook Effect: The Inside Story of the Company that is Connecting the World
(Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2010) [The Facebook Effect]; Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything (And
Why We Should Worry) (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011) [The Googlization of Everything]; Lori
Andrews, I Know Who You Are and I Saw What You Did: Social Networks and the Death of Privacy (New York: Free
Press, 2012) [Social Networks and the Death of Privacy].
26
Hunter v Southam, para 25.
7

of analysis – biographical core and totality of the circumstances – it becomes clear that there are
serious deficiencies in their ability to deal with search and seizure issues in the context of
technology.
Chapters 2 and 3 together provide the necessary background to answer the question of how
the line can be drawn between lawful and unlawful searches of technology and whether the current
framing of section 8 needs to be adjusted to adequately deal with current technology search issues.
In chapter 4, I assess the effectiveness of the framework currently in place and explore
contextual factors around the interpretation of section 8 with a view to examining the major
challenges to achieving certainty. This chapter focuses on the Court’s purported normative
approach and how that approach is not compatible with the tools of analysis designed by the Court.
I also outline a variety of ways in which the Court has added to the uncertainty in their
jurisprudence through their judgements. Lastly, this chapter briefly addresses how the problems
with searches of technology are compounded by the relevant legislation. Essentially, this chapter
establishes the absence of an authoritative answer to my research question.
Chapter 5 recommends a way forward for the SCC to better address searches of technology
within section 8 parameters. I propose a new framework for the analysis of section 8 which
includes expanding section 8 Charter protection past individual considerations of privacy to a
collective understanding of the right which includes using a spectrum of protection. That spectrum
would be assessed using four criteria: intrusiveness, specificity and accuracy of the search and the
type of detail revealed. Three categories along the spectrum are described which demonstrate the
usefulness of this approach. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a view to bringing greater legal
certainty to section 8 of the Charter in the context of technology in criminal investigations.

8

CHAPTER 2: THE USE OF TECHNOLOGIES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter looks at the current state of technology in our society to better understand how
it has become a valuable and desirable component of many criminal investigations. I first detail a
brief history of technology in section 2.2 then address the reality of mass data collection and its
insecurity in section 2.3. I discuss our culture of accepting surveillance in section 2.4, other trends
in social media in section 2.5 and the Internet of Things (IoTs) in section 2.6.

Each of these

sections contributes to our understanding of how technology is part of criminal investigations.
Section 2.7 details how technology can be used as a tool for committing crime and avoiding law
enforcement.

Lastly, section 2.8 draws out the implications of technology for criminal

investigations. The question to consider is how adequately the SCC’s current jurisprudence on
section 8 of the Charter deals with the developing technological challenges and their privacy
implications.

2.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
Technology is ever evolving, and the use of technology has grown exponentially since the
implementation of the Charter in 1982 and the first consideration of section 8 in Hunter v Southam
in 1984. To understand the current state of affairs, it is useful to briefly explore the history of the
internet and how rapidly technology has developed.
The history of computers and the internet is actually less than 50 years old. The personal
computer was developed in the 1970s27 and in 1979 a protocol was created that allowed computers
27

Reg Whitaker, The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance is Becoming a Reality (New York: The New Press,
1999) [The End of Privacy], page 54.
9

to link together over the telephone which “grew together into a network of all networks, the
internet”.28 At that time, no one imagined today’s network connecting hundreds of millions of
computers around the globe. It was in 1978 that the first satellites were launched for the Global
Positioning System (GPS).29 In the 1990s, email began to be used by the general public.30 In 1996
John Perry Barlow – a cattle rancher, lyricist for the Grateful Dead, founding member of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation and a cyberlibertarian31 – wrote “A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace” as part of a movement against the regulation of the internet. 32 At
that time, cyberspace was thought of as a lawless world; somewhere you went to escape.33 Today,
that image is no longer accurate since we are almost constantly online and we can now stray onto
the internet without knowing it.34
The internet, personal computers, cell phones, GPS and emails are now an ordinary part of
everyday life in our society. Technology has changed everything – it has transformed and
continues to transform our economy, society, culture and our understanding of human
interaction.35 The internet has been described as “one of the most important and powerful creations

28

The End of Privacy, page 54. See also Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet - and How to Stop It (London:
Yale University Press, 2008), page 36 for description of growth of internet.
29
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that will Transform how we Live, Work,
and Think (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2013) [Big Data], page 88.
30
The Facebook Effect, page 67.
31
The Guardian, “John Perry Barlow Obituary” (February 11, 2018) online: https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2018/feb/11/john-perry-barlow-obituary.
32
John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (February 8, 1996) online: https://www.eff.
org/cyberspace-independence.
33
Robert Currie and Teresa Scassa, “New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction” (2011)
42 Geo J Intl L 1017 [New First Principles], page 1037.
34
With our devices connected to the internet, we do not even know when we are crossing over into “cyberspace” and
when we are not. We do not “go to” cyberspace, it is constantly interacting with us.
35
The End of Privacy, page 47. See also Morelli, para 114 wherein Justice Deschamps states: “Internet and computer
technologies have brought about tremendous changes in our lives. They facilitate the communication of information
and the exchange of material of all kinds and forms, with both legal and illegal content, and in infinite quantities.”
para 114. See also Hal Abelson, et al, Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness After the Digital Explosion
(Toronto: Addison-Wesley, 2008) [Blown to Bits], page 4 for discussion of digital explosion. In 2006, Time Magazine
declared its Person of the Year to be “You” stating “You control the information age. Welcome to your world.” Time
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in all of human history”.36 It is hard to argue with that statement considering the impact the internet
has had on our society – how we communicate, learn, interact with friends and go about our daily
lives. In fact, access to the internet has transitioned from a luxury to a human right.37
Technology has become pervasive, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. A discussion
of the collection of our data will demonstrate this point.

2.3 MASS DATA COLLECTION AND ITS INSECURITY
The SCC’s approach to informational privacy affects anyone with a credit card, rewards
card, cell phone, smart device, vehicle, computer or social media profile. That is because we live
in a monitored world of mass data collection; technology is pervasive and almost every aspect of
our lives is connected.38 It should not come as a surprise that more data is being collected, stored,
shared and saved about us than ever before,39 and that an ordinary person now generates a colossal
amount of digital information.40 Entire books are written about mass data collection.41 We are

Magazine, “Person of the Year” (December 25, 2006) online: http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,
20061225,00.html.
36
Dave Evans, “The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet is Changing Everything” (CISCO
Internet Business Solutions Group, 2011) [CISCO Report], online: www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/
IoT_IBSG _0411 FINAL.pdf, page 2. See also The Economist, “Plant of the Phones” (February 26, 2015) online:
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645180-smartphone-ubiquitous-addictive-and-transformative-planetphones for how the smart phone has changed society.
37
See New First Principles, page 1044-45 for discussion of internet access as a human right. See also CBC, “CRTC
Declares Broadband Internet Access a Basic Service” (December 21, 2016) online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
crtc-internet-essential-service-1.3906664, Jean-Pierre Blais, CRTC’s Chair stated that the internet is a vital service,
essential to life and success. And see Wired, “UN Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right” (June 3, 2011)
online: https://www.wired.com/2011/06/internet-a-human-right/.
38
See Kieron O’Hara and Nigel Shadbolt, The Spy in the Coffee Machine: The End of Privacy as we Know It (Oxford:
One World Publications, 2008) [The Spy in the Coffee Machine], page 26 for discussion of “fully fledged surveillance
societies” where “most people live reasonably and happily with surveillance”.
39
Big Data, page 150.
40
The Spy in the Coffee Machine, page 98.
41
See for example, Robert Vamosi, When Gadgets Betray Us: The Dark Side of our Infatuation with New Technologies
(New York: Basic Books, 2011); Big Data; Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your
11

under constant digital surveillance. Rewards cards, credit cards and banking cards offer rewards
and convenience in exchange for our data.42 They are effectively electronic tags that locate and
track individuals’ habits.43 Our cell phones and smart watches and Fitbits track our every move.
As Bruce Schneier, internationally renowned security technologist and Chief Technology Officer
at IBM, explained:
Your cell phone tracks where you live and where you work. It tracks where you
like to spend your weekends and evenings. It tracks how often you go to church
(and which church), how much time you spend in a bar, and whether you speed
when you drive. It tracks – since it knows about all the other phones in your area
– whom you spend your days with, whom you meet for lunch, and whom you sleep
with. The accumulated data can probably paint a better picture of how you spend
your time than you can, because it doesn’t have to rely on human memory.44
Corporations use that information to find patterns of where individuals visit so they can employ
targeted specific marketing.45 Our internet activities leave a trail of information about what
websites we visit, searches we conduct and our lifestyle choices.46 Every time we like, follow,
share or click we are producing data. For example, if a woman searches online for anything related
to pregnancy, she is immediately identified and within seconds will be bombarded with
advertisements for baby clothes, strollers, vitamins and pregnancy related items.47 Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) retain data that is regularly traded for targeted marketing of products and

Data and Control Your World (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2015) [Data and Goliath]; The Googlization of
Everything.
42
Blown to Bits, page 11 explains: “Such data is so valuable to planning the supply chain that stores will pay money
to get more of it from their customers. That is really what supermarket loyalty cards provide – shoppers are supposed
to think that the store is granting them a discount in appreciation for their steady business, but actually the store is
paying them for information about their buying patterns. We might better think of a privacy tax – we pay the regular
price unless we want to keep information about our food, alcohol, and pharmaceutical purchases from the market; to
keep our habits to ourselves, we pay extra.”
43
End of Privacy, page 96. These cards capture every item purchased including date and time of purchase, the brand
of every item, the exact time, store location and method of payment.
44
Data and Goliath, page 1-2.
45
See Jose Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013) [Culture of Connectivity], page 124 for discussion of how Google achieved the Holy Grail of monetizing
strategies, “maximizing the ability to distribute personalized commercial messages to mass audiences”.
46
Data and Goliath; See also, Big Data.
47
Inside the Dark Web, (BBC Worldwide Ltd., documentary film: 2014) [Inside the Dark Web].
12

services.48 In most instances, we are unaware that the collection of data is even occurring since it
is happening in the digital background.49 All of that information could obviously be useful to law
enforcement efforts to prevent and investigate crime.
The SCC has shown it is mindful of the magnitude of information that is collected through
our digital activities. In 2014, Justice Karakatsanis acknowledged this phenomenon in the
dissenting judgement of Fearon:
The devices which give us this freedom also generate immense stores of data about
our movements and our lives. Ever-improving GPS technology even allows these
devices to track the locations of their owners. Private digital devices record not only
our core biographical information but our conversations, photos, browsing
interests, purchase records, and leisure pursuits. Our digital footprint is often
enough to reconstruct the events of our lives, our relationships with others, our likes
and dislikes, our fears, hopes, opinions, beliefs and ideas. Our digital devices are
windows to our inner private lives.50
Electronic “bread crumbs” leave behind a trail that others can reconstruct years later.51 While data
collection is obviously valuable to corporations, law enforcement could also benefit significantly
from having access to individuals’ data. Police could easily find out the location of a suspect or
patterns of a suspect’s activities through searches of their technology.
The SCC has recognized that computers and cell phones are portals to a wealth of
information which make them quantitatively and qualitatively different than other items.52 Morelli

48

Nathaniel Gleicher, “Neither a Customer Nor a Subscriber Be, Regulating the Release of User Information on the
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was the first case wherein the SCC recognized the powerful privacy interests in digital data. Justice
Fish said, “It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy
than the search and seizure of a personal computer”.53 In Vu, the SCC explained that a search
warrant for a home does not include searches of computers found inside. Justice Cromwell for the
unanimous court explained:
The privacy interests implicated by computer searches are markedly different from those
at stake in searches of receptacles such as cupboards and filing cabinets. Computers
potentially give police access to vast amounts of information that users cannot control, that
they may not even be aware of or may have chosen to discard and which may not be, in
any meaningful sense, located in the place of the search.54
For these reasons the SCC has consistently held that digital devices attract a high privacy interest.55
Data collection cannot be considered in isolation. We also need to consider what control
we have over our enormous amount of electronic data. Technology, together with a connected
world, means that we inevitably lose track of the digital information about us and retain little
control over our information in the world.56 Privacy policies that determine our ability to control
our information are lengthy and complex, with consumers having no bargaining power and
accepting the “click to accept” model of acquiescence. Consumers agree to terms without taking
the time to understand what those terms mean.57 In addition, many of the policies require working
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within privacy settings with a level of technical proficiency that many of us simply do not
possess.58
Any discussion of mass data collection is not complete without addressing the reality of
data breaches, hacks and security failures which have become an unfortunate side effect of
technology and a normal part of our interaction with it. In 2014, CNN reported that 47% of
American adults were hacked in that year.59 According to their numbers, two of the largest hacks
in 2014 were the 70 million Target customers’ personal information and 33 million Adobe user’s
credentials that were compromised.60 In 2016, Uber confirmed that a data breach affected 57
million of their customers and drivers61, of which 815,000 were Canadians.62 In 2017, Yahoo
announced that 3 billion accounts – including email, Tumblr, Fantasy and Flickr – experienced a
data breach in 2013.63 One of the most widespread and well-known data breaches was the
WannaCry ransomware outbreak from May 2017. The ransomware hit UK hospitals, forcing the
closure of entire wards and the crippling of the National Health Service. 64 The WannaCry attack
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was described as a “cyber pandemic” as companies and governments were affected across the
globe.65 Tens of thousands of infections were reported in 74 countries as of May 12, 2017.66 Also
in 2017, Equifax announced a breach that involved sensitive data of 247 million consumers67 and
approximately 19,000 Canadians.68 Equifax stated that personal information, including social
security numbers were compromised.69 The government of Canada has faced the threat and reality
of cyberattacks.70 In fact, the Globe and Mail reported that the federal government suffered 4,571
known “system compromises” in 2016.71 More recently, Facebook “improperly shared” the data
of up to 87 million of its users,72 including more than 600,000 Canadians.73 In a 2018 interview
with CNBC, Jeff Faulkner, acting President and CEO of the National Foundation for Credit
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Counselling, stated that “there are roughly over 1,500 breaches a year”.74 It seems as though every
year the data breaches and security failures are increasing in number and affecting

more

individuals.75 Even Canadian banks are targets of hackers and cannot prevent data breaches of
customers’ personal data.76 These breaches, obviously, vary in their severity based on the
information that is stolen – ranging from passwords, date of birth and mother’s maiden name to
credit card and social insurance numbers.77 There is now an entire industry based on cyber
security.78 It is important to note that a breach of privacy or hack of one company or individual is
a breach of many people’s privacy. The interconnectedness of technology and people within
society through technology means that it is more likely a collective is impacted by any breach.
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Popular culture has normalized data breaches and network hacks in fictional drama series.
CSI: Cyber79 and Wisdom of the Crowd80 are two network television shows with hacking and
technology as the main themes. In addition, other shows reference technology and data breaches
regularly as part of their plot line.81 It seems as though every network TV show has addressed
hacking and data security breaches in at least one episode, reflecting our culture.
Several more pages could be written about data breaches, hacks and security failures. I
think the point has been made – that we live in a society where it is more likely than not that you
will experience some form of data breach, either with respect to your email, health records, banking
or something more inconsequential. Data intrusions are now regular occurrences and no longer
seem shocking.82 In spite of these data breaches and security failures, individuals are still eager to
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obtain the newest technology. Opting out of social media and technology altogether is not a
realistic option, unless you enjoy living like a hermit.83 As one author explained: “it would mean
opting out of sociality all together, since online activities are completely intertwined with offline
social life”.84 This is the context and reality of technology today. Law enforcement are eager to
gain access to criminal suspects’ data in order to create a full picture of the individual’s activity.
Hacking into a computer device or gaining access through a security failure or benefiting from a
data leak are ways for police to access that information but is any of those lawful access?

2.4 SURVEILLANCE AS ENTERTAINMENT
Willingly submitting to surveillance has become a trend within our mainstream
entertainment. As Canadian communications theorist Marshall McLuhan claimed “the medium is
the message” – meaning that the medium affects society in a fundamental way. His references
were in relation to a change from print media to television, wherein television became the dominant
medium and changed its users.85 Popular culture has embraced the idea of Big Brother and
surveillance as entertainment.86 Voluntarily being under constant surveillance and having your
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entire life open for viewing by the public has become a popular and desirable ambition. 87 For
example, Big Brother, Big Brother Canada and Celebrity Big Brother are all popular Global TV
shows based on 24-hour surveillance, called “live feeds”.88 Big Brother Canada’s tag line at the
end of every episode is “Remember, someone is always watching!”. The Survivor89 and Real
Housewives90 franchises are some of the most popular reality TV shows, along with an assortment
of shows that follow the lives of different individuals – whether selling or renovating real estate,91
cooking/baking,92 finding a spouse,93 or losing weight.94 TV shows capturing the lives of
individuals are very popular95 with many of these shows having been on television for over a
decade.96 A more recent form of entertainment, YouTube, has allowed everyone and their dog to
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become an instant celebrity. YouTube’s mission is “to give everyone a voice and show them the
world”.97 It boasts over 1 billion users, with videos in 88 countries and 76 languages.98 The
company claims that 1 billion hours of video is viewed on a daily basis. 99 A popular trend on
YouTube is now creating videos about YouTube videos, wherein people record their reactions and
commentary on YouTube videos while they are watching them.100 Many of us no longer watch
television but have become the subject and entertainment through being watched. This form of
entertainment illustrates how surveillance has become normalized and trivialized. As a society,
we no longer fear George Orwell’s 1984 description of Big Brother but have accepted, chosen and
embraced surveillance.
Even if we are not the subject being watched on television or have our own YouTube
channel, we still share details of our lives on Facebook, Twitter or other social media platforms.
People describe their daily movements and activities, sometimes in excruciating detail, for their
friends and acquaintances to follow. This cultural norm of sharing, and many times oversharing,
provides law enforcement with information about our lives that we do not always appreciate.

2.5 USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO PERPETRATE AND INVESTIGATE CRIME
One cannot fully and accurately review the influence of technology in today’s culture
without mentioning social media. The norms for sociality have drastically changed for an entire
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generation who understand social media as a normal part of our existence. The social impact of
this form of media is immeasurable. Social media permeates our lives. Social media is internet
based, interactive platforms that allow for multi-party live communication.101 Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube and many other social media platforms have created a “new reality” wherein people are
connected on a global and instantaneous basis.102 Facebook’s mission is to “give people the power
to build community and bring the world closer together”.103 Since its inception in 2004 as a
university student project, Facebook has grown to 1.4 billion daily active users and 2.13 billion
monthly active users as of December 2017.104 Approximately 42% of Canada’s entire population
were Facebook users in 2010.105 It is important to recognize that while Facebook has innumerable
trivial messages and posts, it has also changed how “people communicate and interact, how
markets sell products, how governments reach out to citizens, and even how companies operate.
It is altering the character of political activism, and in some countries, it is starting to affect the
process of democracy itself”.106 Facebook caused a shift in the boundaries of personal privacy
with many users willingly displaying intimate details of their lives.107
The phrase “Facebook effect” has been coined to refer to the trend of ordinary individuals,
with no specialized skills or training, initiating broadcast as editor, content creator, producer and
distributor.108 This is clearly seen through platforms like YouTube and Twitter. A popular micro-
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blogging platform, Twitter, allows users to communicate with 280 characters at a time. 109

In

2009, Twitter had 50 million members.110 Twitter is now a “global format for online public
commentary” and a common tool for cultural discourse.111 Given its immediate and brief nature,
Twitter has become embedded in society as a “stream of global consciousness”

112

allowing

everyone to see what is “happening in the world right now”.113
These platforms have been normalized into everyday life. They show an “acceptance of
connective media penetrating all aspects of sociality”.114 Even our vocabulary has adjusted to this
new social media world.115 The word “tweet” was added to the Oxford English Dictionary in June
2013116 and “unfriend” was named the “2009 Word of the Year” by Oxford Dictionaries.117 TV
shows imbed social media in their storylines and provide interactive opportunities throughout their
broadcasting.118 Social media has changed the way people communicate and our collective
expectations of privacy in those communications. There has been a shift in what society consider
private and personal versus public. Social media favours sociality, openness and sharing. In
addition, there has been a dramatic change in the level of interconnectedness between people,
where our networks no longer consist of just our relatives and close friends.
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Social media is used as both a means for criminals to commit their crimes and as a way for
law enforcement to investigate criminal activity. The frequency of online child exploitation has
resulted in a specialized unit of the RCMP. The National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre
deals exclusively with “investigations related to the sexual exploitation of children on the internet
in Canada”.119 As the Mills case demonstrated, social media platforms like Facebook are used by
predators to find and communicate with vulnerable children with the aim to sexually abuse them.
Mills also shows how police can use social media to investigate and capture those predators. Law
enforcement can observe our social media lives and engage with us through social media to
investigate criminal activity.
We now share our data with the things in our lives as the next section will explain.

2.6 THE INTERNET OF THINGS
The term “Internet of Things” (IoTs) generally refers to things “such as devices or sensors
– other than computers, smartphones or tablets – that connect, communicate or transmit
information with or between each other through the Internet”.120 The IoTs is creating data within
our homes; traditionally considered one of the most private of spaces. There are now more
“things” connected to the internet than people.121 Smart devices are becoming increasingly
popular. It is expected that by 2020 there will be 50 billion internet connected devices. 122 The
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IoTs has become common to many Canadian households in the form of wearable technology (such
as smart watches, fitness trackers and medical devices), connected automation systems (adjusting
light bulbs, coffee machines,123 music and temperature), smart TVs124, baby monitors125, security
systems, appliances, etc.126 As one writer put it, “the physical and the digital world blur into each
other”.127 The World Bank is even hoping to “harness big data from the Internet of Things (IoT)
to help end extreme poverty and unlock new drivers of economic growth”.128
Connected devices are used for energy efficiency, entertainment, wellness, home safety,
home comfort, daily tasks and connectivity. IoTs gather large quantities of information about
private activities, preferences and habits in the home to optimize the function of the device. 129 We
regularly face encroachments on our privacy in exchange for perceived positive benefits we get
from handing over our personal information.130
These connected devices claim to make life easier but will also record, collect, transmit,
store, analyze and share vast amounts of personal information, such as exact location, financial
account numbers, specific health information, details regarding personal habits, patterns of
behaviour and preferences. This is mass data collection taken to the extreme. Smart devices can
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easily be used as tools of invasive surveillance. These different devices have varying levels of
data intrusion, from the mundane to the extremely personal.131 Smart devices can be used to spy
on their owners since they record and track their users’ movements, actions and words in a most
exact way. Fitbit has even been partially credited with solving a murder investigation.132 It should
not be surprising that companies have plans to put all these devices together to create “smart
cities”. There have been proposals for a “smart city” in Toronto, Ontario. Sidewalk Labs, an
Alphabet subsidiary, proposal provides: “Welcome to Quayside, the world’s first neighbourhood
built from the internet up… with connectivity designed into its very foundation.”133 The imagined
city will have cameras deployed to cover the entire space and systems will detect when trash bins
need to be emptied.134 Sensors will detect air quality, noise levels, flow of vehicles, cyclists, buses,
pedestrians and weather.135 It is expected that there would be thermal, electric and cost savings.136
The idea is that the data will provide insight to run the city most efficiently. This new, “unimagined
extreme” of data collection creates obvious privacy concerns.137 This city of surveillance tracks
every activity to learn residents’ habits and adapt. Sidewalk Lab’s chief policy officer, Rit
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Aggarwala explained that “If people directly see value to having more information collected about
them, they will be willing participants”.138
One of the newer and popular IoTs is the digital assistant. Amazon’s Alexa139 and Google’s
Home140 are two of the more well-known versions. Alexa is a device that allows you to “play
music, control your smart home, get information, news, weather, and more using just your
voice”.141 Amazon advertises Alexa Smart Home Devices that “let you voice-control thousands
of different smart home devices such as lights, switches, TVs, thermostats and more from over
1,200 unique brands”. Millions of these devices have been sold and excitedly brought into homes
across the world, traditionally one of the most private of spaces. 142 The Alexa’s Terms of Use
Policy provides:
Amazon processes and retains your Alexa Interactions, such as your voice inputs,
music playlists, and your Alexa to-do and shopping lists, in the cloud to provide,
personalize, and improve our services.143
Alexa Interactions are defined as:
all information related to your use of Alexa and Alexa Enabled Products, including
your voice and other inputs, responses provided to you through Alexa, information
we receive in connection with Third Party Services and Auxiliary Products you use,
and information and content you provide or receive through the Alexa App.
138
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Essentially, Alexa collects and retains all this information. There is no information about how
long Amazon stores that data. Google Home’s website indicates they keep the data “until you
choose to delete it”.144 It is a microphone in your home ready to listen and record everything you
say to it or to those around you.145 It can make calls for you, text for you and essentially become
entrenched in your everyday life, supposedly to make life easier. The threats to privacy through
data breaches, hacks, security failures or malfunctions are not hard to imagine. One recent example
made headline news. A woman in Oregon discovered that her Alexa had surreptitiously recorded
a conversation between her and her husband and then sent the audio recording to a random person
on their contact list.146 The possibilities for law enforcement to use a digital assistant are almost
limitless. They could effectively use an Amazon Alexa or Google Home as an audio recording
device (aka a room probe) without ever having to enter the residence and risk being caught in the
act of placing such a device.
Even data from your smart fridge can tell a lot about you. Every time a person opens the
door, the time and date are stored in a database.147 That activity can be monitored to establish
patterns of activity of the resident. For example, if the fridge door opens every day between
7:15am and 7:45am and then again between 4:30pm and 5:30pm, the recipient of that data would
be able to make an educated guess that the resident works a 9am to 5pm job and is not home during
the day. That is not to say a fridge’s data can precisely determine a person’s routine but it can be
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added to a composition of information. For a police investigation, that data could be used to verify
surveillance observations or to help determine the best time to conduct a covert entry into the home
to gather physical evidence. If police suspect drug trafficking is being operated out of an apartment
they will want to gain entry to that apartment to look around when no one is home. They will
perhaps take photographs and samples of any drugs in the residence to add to the body of evidence
against the suspect.
This new reality of IoTs will likely be the next technological frontier for the SCC to
consider with respect to section 8 analysis. The ability of police to obtain data from the IoTs is
almost unlimited yet the lawfulness of such searches is uncertain.

2.7 TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS FOR CRIME
Technology facilitates new crimes and changes how traditional crimes are committed. In
understanding technology we should keep in mind that the internet can be used to carry out
cyberattacks, trafficking of drugs, explosives, and weapons, human smuggling, child exploitation,
terrorist financing and money laundering, as well as a variety of other serious crimes without
regard for national boundaries.148 These crimes may be perpetrated on the surface web; that is,
web sites indexed by search engines.149 In addition to the surface web, there is a layer of the
internet called the deep web, and beyond there the dark web. The deep web is made up of internet
content that is not indexed by search engines, such as intranet sites and other sites accessible via
login criteria.150 The dark web, like the deep web, is not indexed and is designed to operate and
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be accessed anonymously. To access the dark web anonymously, certain software is required.
The Onion Router (TOR) is one such type of software.151 TOR was originally developed by the
US Naval Research Laboratory to allow secure communications and to protect the online identity
of American spies.152 TOR is now free to download and operates to hide a user’s IP address and
browsing history; it is described as “an effective censorship circumvention tool.”153 Having the
benefit of anonymity provides essential secrecy for military and intelligence officers, political
dissidents, journalists and whistleblowers. However, online anonymizing services allow criminals
to use the technology opportunistically, making law enforcement efforts more difficult in
combating crime on the dark web.154 This “rising popularity of encryption” makes law
enforcement efforts increasingly difficult.155
Criminals often use cryptocurrency online to ensure their anonymity. Cryptocurrency is
virtual money that is untraceable because it uses digital encryption technology. It offers many
benefits, such as increased payment efficiency, accessibility and low transaction costs. While it
has legal uses, cryptocurrency has essentially become “the new hidden suitcase full of unmarked
bills”.156

Arguably the most well-known cryptocurrency is Bitcoin.157

Bitcoin allows the

exchange of money on the dark web to be entirely anonymous. It has become an essential
“accessory to cybercrime”,158 and so closely associated with the dark web that it has been referred
to as “drug barter tokens”.159 TOR, together with Bitcoin, has made digital black markets on the
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dark web possible.160 One of the most successful drug markets on the dark web was the Silk
Road.161 A large percentage of sellers on the Silk Road are from Canada. 162 The Silk Road and
other websites like it allow buying and selling of drugs on the dark web as easily as buying a book
from Amazon or eBay.163 Drug transactions are conducted openly on the site because the users
enjoy anonymity. There is a “buffet for narcotics” readily available. 164 The creator of the Silk
Road, Ross Ulbricht, boasted to Forbes magazine that “we’ve won the state’s war on drugs because
of Bitcoin”.165 Interestingly, the IoTs, crime and bitcoin come together. As a recent CBC news
story explained, criminal hackers used smart appliances to mine bitcoins in a case known as a
cryptojacking.166 Martin Hron, a security researcher at antivirus developer Avast, warned that “the
risk is growing as more everyday devices connect to the internet – from ovens to home lighting
systems – and that these are often the least secure”.167
There are few barriers to entry to the dark web: it requires little expertise, is quick and
accessible. It is extremely difficult for law enforcement to determine a location or name of
someone engaging in criminal behavior.

To further complicate the matter, it operates

transnationally through servers all over the world. The fact that a middle-class American college
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student with a complete lack of criminal history and a “reputation for peacefulness” could become
one of the biggest drug lords on the dark web demonstrates the powerful protection anonymity
provides.168 A reality has been created where a drug dealer who uses a computer is far less likely
to face detection and prosecution than if they sold drugs on a street corner. This is because people
can be identified and followed from a street corner, but they cannot be tracked or followed from
the dark web because their IP address is hidden from view. The transactions are done in an open
forum market; police can see the transactions but cannot identify the parties involved.169
In addition to the internet, communication technology assists criminals in evading law
enforcement. While not created specifically for criminal use, these technologies certainly seem to
be designed to maximize criminal activity. Encrypted communications are widely available. 170
Messages that auto-delete and video conversations that cannot be captured are the norm. It is
impractical for law enforcement to decrypt or capture these types of communications. Remote
Administration Tools (RATs) are another technological advancement that criminals employ.
RATs allow a user to control their devices remotely. It does not take much imagination to guess
how a criminal could benefit from such technology. Remote erasing of messages is useful if a
criminal’s phone is seized by police. The ability to take a photograph and pinpoint a GPS location
when a phone is accessed is useful if a police agent or the police are covertly accessing the device.
The criminal then knows the device was accessed by someone other than themselves and can
capture a photograph of that person. If the person accessing the device is a confidential informant
or police agent, the criminal has captured their images. These counter surveillance methods allow
criminals to detect and avoid police presence. The safety of police confidential informants and
undercover officers can be at serious risk if a criminal has a RAT on their device. Police must
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prepare and tailor their investigations for a level of sophistication made possible by the
proliferation of these types of technologies, which are cheap and easy to obtain.
These technologies allow individuals to hide behind enhanced privacy to commit crimes
online or organize criminal activities through encrypted online communications. Some of the
technological abilities are seemingly crafted specifically for the criminal underworld. As the
Canadian Association of Police Chiefs explained:
Digital security technology has now advanced to the point that impenetrable password
protection and encryption are readily – and in many cases freely – available on all
electronic devices. This technology immunizes legally seized electronic devices from the
execution of a judicially authorized search, and often compels the abrupt and unsuccessful
end of a serious criminal investigation. Recent law enforcement experience provides
specific examples of criminal investigations that have been derailed in this manner.171
The reality is that these technologies provide a level of sophistication to criminals that was
previously reserved for serious organized crime groups with technical skills. As a result, law
enforcement has limited success in investigating and capturing criminals who take advantage of
technology and anonymity.172
The right of an individual to use the internet anonymously and employ tools to evade law
enforcement must be weighed against society’s need to counter the threat to public order and
security that takes place on the internet. In spite of its many social benefits, the internet is a
powerful tool in the hands of those who use it to do harm.
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2.8 CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of some highlights of our technological reality – mass data
collection, prevalence of data breaches, surveillance as entertainment, social media and the IoTs –
shows how technology now forms part of many criminal investigations. Technology acts as a
scrupulous record keeper automatically compiling data of our activities. Most people are unaware
and ignorant of the fact that most of their devices and applications compromise their privacy. 173
All this data can be tremendously beneficial to criminal investigations and prosecutions. The next
chapter will look at how section 8 of the Charter aims to protect that data against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
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CHAPTER 3: UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This project explores the distinct sphere of informational privacy within section 8 case law
and specifically how the law concerning informational privacy should adapt to emerging
technologies. With the development of the Internet of Things (IoTs), the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) will likely soon be forced to consider the boundaries of informational privacy in this new
technology. This chapter outlines the development and current state of the law on section 8 of the
Charter which is necessary to understand the analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The SCC has

interpreted section 8 of the Charter as requiring a normative inquiry, focusing on the concept of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The normative quality of the section 8 inquiry is explained in
section 3.2. Section 3.3 then explains how the SCC strives to achieve a balance between law
enforcement efforts and individual privacy interests. Section 3.4 introduces two of the main tools
of analysis employed by the Court in section 8 cases. This chapter aims to inform the reader of
foundational section 8 principles before moving on to explore the challenges specific to their
application to technology.
The SCC has consistently identified three distinct spheres of privacy deserving of
constitutional protection – spatial, personal and informational.174 These privacy interests are
distinct from one another but commonly overlap.175 Spatial privacy, also termed territorial
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privacy, involves one’s privacy in places. For example, one has territorial privacy in one’s home
or vehicle. Personal privacy relates to bodily integrity; to one’s body and bodily substances.
Informational privacy has been defined as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others”.176

The SCC initially addressed informational privacy in R v Dyment.177 In that case,

a doctor collected a blood sample from an unconscious patient and provided it to police for their
investigation into a motor vehicle accident. Personal privacy and the confidentiality of a doctorpatient relationship weighed heavily in the SCC majorities’ decision to exclude the evidence from
trial.178 In the reasons for judgement, Justice LaForest adopted a view of informational privacy
from the Department of Justice Task Force on Privacy and Computers. He cited the Task Force
report, saying: “This notion of [informational] privacy derives from the assumption that all
information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for
himself as he sees fit”.179 Essentially, informational privacy is concerned with that information
about our lives that should be protected from disclosure to the State.

3.2

A NORMATIVE AND NEUTRAL INQUIRY
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms forms part of the Constitution of Canada,

1982; being “the supreme law of Canada”.180 Since the Charter forms part of the Constitution it
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requires a flexible interpretation that can adapt to changes over time, including changing societal
values.181 The SCC, in Hunter v Southam specifically adopted this flexible interpretation for
section 8 of the Charter. 182 Justice Dickson (as he then was), in writing the unanimous judgment,
explained that section 8 “must be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social,
political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers”. 183 To achieve this flexibility,
section 8 of the Charter should be given a “broad, purposive analysis”.184 The SCC identified the
purpose of section 8 as to prevent unjustified state intrusion on individual privacy.185 Hunter v
Southam continues to be a seminal judgement for section 8 cases as it recognized an “individual’s
right to privacy”.186 Individuals charged with a criminal offence regularly challenge searches that
have led to the seizure of incriminating evidence in the hopes that the evidence will be excluded
from their trial under section 24(2) of the Charter and they will avoid a guilty verdict. They argue
a violation of their section 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure and, therefore, only protects a
reasonable expectation of privacy.187 In R v Cole, Justice Fish plainly stated “[p]rivacy is a matter
of reasonable expectations”.188 A diminished expectation of privacy is still reasonable and attracts
section 8 Charter protection; subject to intrusion only with lawful authority.189 Where there is an
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intrusion on any reasonable expectation of privacy, the state action will be considered a “search”
for section 8 purposes.190 Two distinct questions arise in every section 8 analysis. The first
question asks: Does the accused have a reasonable expectation of privacy, such that a search or
seizure has taken place?191 If the answer to this question is no, there is no section 8 Charter issue.
If the answer to the first question is yes, the analysis must continue to the second question: Was
the search or seizure an unreasonable intrusion on that privacy? 192 Hunter v Southam established
prior authorization as a “precondition for a valid search and seizure”.193 There are some situations
which allow for warrantless searches, such as searches incident to lawful arrest, but the SCC set
out the default standard to achieve. Any search involving a Charter protected privacy interest will
be considered reasonable if it is authorized by law, the law itself is reasonable, and the search is
conducted in a reasonable manner.194 A search conducted under the authority of a warrant is
presumptively reasonable, having satisfied a judicial authority that there are sufficient reasonable
and probable grounds for the search.195 Alternatively, a warrantless search attracts a presumption
of unreasonableness.196 This system of prior authorization, instead of after-the-fact validation,
avoids a justification mentality. It is important to note that the consequence of this framework
means that if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no requirement to obtain prior
authorization. Therefore, whether there is any reasonable expectation of privacy is effectively a
threshold question.
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Framing section 8 cases using a normative inquiry is required in order to achieve the
Charter’s purposive approach. In Tessling, the SCC explained that the inquiry into whether a
person has an expectation of privacy “is a normative rather than descriptive standard”. 197 The
Court asks what information ought to be protected by section 8, not whether it actually is
protected.198 For example, in Dyment, the patient did not actually maintain control or privacy over
the blood sample when it was taken by the doctor and given to the police, but he nevertheless
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The Court recognized that taking a blood
sample from an unconscious person without their consent by a doctor is a violation of one’s dignity
and privacy that should not be accepted in our society.199 In R v Plant, Justice Sopinka, writing
for the majority, dealt with an informational privacy case. In finding that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in computerized electricity records maintained by the utility, 200 he
explained:
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting
that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal
information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to
maintain and control from dissemination to the state.201 [emphasis added]
We can wish to retain control over our information and keep it from the State, even if that
is not the reality of the situation. Plant did not have actual control over his electricity records held
by the utility company but would wish to maintain control from State access. The fact that an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or technology company can provide information to the police does
not make it reasonable nor lead to the conclusion that a reasonable expectation of privacy has
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disappeared on a normative analysis.202 The SCC uses this normative approach to secure our
privacy interests. In fact, the SCC has explicitly rejected a “risk analysis” approach to section 8
cases which focuses on the risk that those guilty of wrongdoing have assumed.203 According to
the Court:
… privacy would be inadequately protected if an assessment of the reasonableness
of a given expectation of privacy were made to rest on a consideration whether the
person concerned had courted the risk of electronic surveillance. In view of the
advanced state of surveillance technology, this would be to adopt a meaningless
standard for, in the final analysis, the technical resources which agents of the state
have at their disposal ensure that we now run the risk of having our words recorded
virtually every time we speak to another human being.204
If the Court were to adopt the risk analysis instead of rejecting it, they would have to
consider the technological realities of today. As early as 1990, the SCC recognized that “modern
methods of electronic surveillance have the potential, if uncontrolled, to annihilate privacy”.205
Since then, online privacy has really become something of an oxymoron. In August 1997, Time
Magazine’s cover story entitled "The Death of Privacy" stated: “You have no secrets. At the ATM,
on the Internet, even walking down the street, people are watching your every move.” 206 As one
popular 2017 drama series character explained: “we gave that [privacy] up a long time ago so we
could watch cat videos on our phones.”207 The impressive growth in technology has fundamentally
altered our expectations about what will be private; it has “shifted our thinking about what should
be private”.208
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The SCC has made reference to George Orwell’s novel 1984, based on a dystopian
surveillanced world, numerous times over the years.209 In Tessling, Justice Binnie for a unanimous
Court quoted 1984 to make the point that “technological surveillance raises extremely serious
concerns”.210 Justice Binnie again in M(A) referred to 1984, stating: “the fact is that 1984 came
and went without George Orwell’s fears being entirely realized, although he saw earlier than most
the direction in which things might be heading.”211 In Fearon, Justice Karakatsanis in dissent
made the statement that “as technology changes, our law must also evolve so that modern mobile
devices do not become the telescreens of George Orwell’s 1984”.212 Nonetheless, some argue that
“1984 is here, and we like it”.213 Orwell imagined cameras everywhere – that is our reality. And
cameras are not the most pervasive of today’s tracking technologies. Some have equated our
hyper-surveillance society with a panopticon.214 Numerous authors have asserted that we now live
in a “post-privacy world”215 where we have swapped privacy for a plethora of perks only dreamt
of a decade ago.216 As one author put it: “Modest incentives induced individuals to sacrifice their
personal privacy – often before they understood what they were giving up…The next generation
may not even see the loss of privacy as a sacrifice.”217 With the pervasiveness of technology in
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society, “we have become unwitting, or perhaps, all too willing, participants in our own privacy
invasions.”218 The Court has been using the normative approach to assessing section 8 privacy
interests in such a way so as to protect us from this reality. By asking what privacy we ought to
have, instead of that which is actually available to us, section 8 protects a larger sphere of our
information.
The SCC has continually held that it is important to frame the question as a neutral
query.219 This means that the nature of the privacy interest does not depend on whether the privacy
protects legal or illegal activity.220 A court’s analysis must ignore the results of the search to avoid
any after-the-fact justification and maintain section 8’s purpose to prevent unjustified searches. In
R v Wong, the accused was found operating an illegal gambling operation in a hotel room. Framing
the question in broad and neutral terms meant asking whether “persons who retire to a hotel room
and close the door behind them have a reasonable expectation of privacy?” 221 In R v Patrick, the
police searched the household trash of the accused left out for collection and found evidence of an
ecstasy lab.222 The SCC explained:
The issue is not whether the appellant had a legitimate privacy interest in the
concealment of drug paraphernalia, but whether people generally have a privacy
interest in the concealed contents of an opaque and sealed “bag of information”.223
This neutral framing of the search question continues to be the preferred approach to section 8
cases.224
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Almost all of the litigation involving section 8 of the Charter deal with individuals who
we know are factually guilty of the charges alleged. The temptation to assume that the charged
person is always guilty must be resisted however as innocent persons are subject to the same police
conduct.225 In addition, most criminal cases are actually disposed of without a trial, so no judgment
is ever written on the search. Because of these considerations, we must be open minded and
consider the constitutional protections as though all individuals are factually innocent.

3.3

BALANCING VALUES
It is important to understand that once it has been established that there is a reasonable

expectation of privacy (the threshold question), the task of any section 8 analysis is to balance
competing values; individual interests and rights against our collective preference and desire for
security. Section 8 of the Charter “is concerned with the degree of privacy needed to maintain a
free and open society”.226 The SCC articulated the balancing in Hunter v Southam as follows:
… an assessment must be made as to whether in a particular situation the public’s
interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s
interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals,
notably those of law enforcement.227
The SCC has explained that the balance is a “delicate”228 one between privacy and law
enforcement interests that must be “calibrated according to the circumstances”.229 The competing
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values involved are interrelated230 and the weight placed on these values changes over time.231
The system of prior authorization allows a judicial actor to balance the conflicting interests of the
state and individual; only where the state’s interests are demonstrably superior and compelling will
the search be authorized.
Privacy is meant to protect “individuality, autonomy, dignity, emotional release, selfevaluation, and interpersonal relationships”.232 While privacy “is at the heart of liberty in a modern
state”,233 it must be subject to limits. When speaking with students from the University of
Toronto’s Faculty of Law, in an interview for their student newspaper Ultra Vires at the end of
2014, Justice Abella explained: privacy law must allow “enough space for individual dignity and
autonomy” but must also “acknowledge public interests that may be countervailing”.234
Suppression of crime is a legitimate societal value. The state has an obligation to citizens to uphold
the law and protect them against criminal activity. As concisely put by Justice Binnie in R v
Tessling, the “community wants privacy, but it also insists on protection”.235 And Justice Arbour
noted in B(SA), “[e]ffective law enforcement benefits society as a whole”.236 There must be a
balanced approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy. Desires are high on both sides of the
equation – people would like total privacy protection from the State and police would like open
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access to all our information with no barriers to access. It is a “matter of degree rather than an allor-nothing distinction”.237
The SCC consistently views privacy as an individual right, essential for personal autonomy
and dignity, and a societal good necessary for democracy.238 They hold that it allows individuals
the freedom to debate, associate and organize free from state surveillance. This view of section 8
protection as an individual claim and privilege is not inherent to section 8 but it does affect how
the discussion unfolds. In Edwards, the SCC was asked whether a boyfriend had any section 8
privacy protection in evidence obtained from his girlfriend’s apartment. A majority of the Court
framed the privacy question as a personal right issue.239 Justice Cory explained:
Since no personal right of the appellant was affected by the police conduct at the
apartment, the appellant could not contest the admissibility of the evidence pursuant
to s. 24(2) of the Charter. It is therefore not necessary to consider either this aspect
of the case or whether Ms. Evers did in fact consent to the search of her apartment.
This is, in itself, a sufficient basis for dismissing the appeal.240
Justice LaForest expressly disagreed with the majorities characterization of the right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. In his dissenting judgement he wrote:
… I am deeply concerned with the implications of these reasons which, I think,
result in a drastic diminution of the protection to the public that s. 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was intended to ensure.
…
As I see it, the protection accorded by s. 8 is not in its terms limited to searches of
premises over which an accused has a personal right to privacy in the sense of some
direct control or property. Rather the provision is intended to afford protection to
all of us to be secure against intrusion by the state or its agents by unreasonable
searches or seizures …. The section, it must be remembered, reads: "Everyone has
the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure" (emphasis added). It
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is a right enuring to all the public. It applies to everyone, an expression that unlike
many of the other Charter provisions is not qualified by express circumstances,
such as, for example, s. 9 which protects everyone arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned, s. 10, which applies to everyone arrested or detained, and s. 11, which
is limited to a person charged with an offence. Moreover, s. 8 does not merely
prohibit unreasonable searches or seizures, but also guarantees to everyone the right
to be secure against such unjustified state action… It is a public right, enjoyed by
all of us.
…
The issue has not yet been directly raised because the cases dealt with in this Court
have thus far been centered on cases of unreasonable searches directly involving
the personal expectation of privacy of an accused person. But the approach I am
suggesting is entirely consistent with the conceptual, societal and constitutional
underpinnings of the right guaranteed by s. 8….
As Justice LaForest noted back in 1996, section 8 did not have to be limited as an individual right
but rather could be viewed as a collective value, recognizing with our shared values of sociality,
connectiveness and openness.

Yet the Court consciously has framed privacy as an individual

right. The implications of framing section 8 protection as an individual, instead of a collective,
right is explored further in chapter 5 where I discuss options for moving forward with a clearer
section 8 jurisprudence. For now, it is significant to note that the balancing of rights is restricted
by the individual considerations on one side against with societal protection on the other.

3.4 TOOLS OF ANALYSIS FOR SECTION 8 ANALYSIS
This section introduces the reader to two main tools of analysis employed by the Court in
section 8 cases. An understanding of these tools is necessary to appreciate what challenges they
present and what changes are required to improve section 8 jurisprudence moving forward.
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3.4.1 The Biographical Core
The SCC has often expressed the view that section 8 of the Charter should seek to protect
a biographical core of personal information, including information which tends to reveal intimate
details of lifestyle and personal choices. The concept has experienced broad acceptance in its
application but has seemingly waned over time.
A biographical core of information was first discussed by the SCC in 1993 in the Plant
case. This was the first time the SCC considered the search of computer records241 and there was
uncertainty as to how to treat them. Police had obtained a search warrant for a residence based on
a tip, observations from a perimeter search and results of a comparison of computerized electricity
records. The search found 112 marihuana plants. The trial judge had found that the records check
was not a search for section 8 purposes because the records did not belong to the accused. The
Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the information belonged to the Calgary Utilities Commission
and had been created in the context of a commercial relationship. They found that the computer
search did not violate section 8. One of the questions for consideration on appeal to the SCC was
whether the police check of the computerized electrical records violated section 8. Justice Sopinka,
for the majority at the SCC, articulated a framework for determining the nature and extent of a
reasonable expectation of privacy of information.

In finding that the homeowner had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in electricity records maintained by the utility, he explained:
In order for constitutional protection to be extended to commercial documents, the
information seized must be of a personal and confidential nature. In fostering the
underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that s. 8 of the
Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal information which
individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control
from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to
241
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reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.242
[emphasis added]
This first framing of the biographical core attempts to delineate what information is protected by
section 8; the idea being that not all information attracts equal constitutional protection. If
information is part of one’s biographical core, it will undoubtedly attract privacy protection
without further inquiry.243 Plant had failed to bring the computer search within the parameters of
section 8. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice McLachlin, in separate reasons, concurring in
the result, would have included the very fact of criminality as part of the lifestyle of the accused.
In finding he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records, she wrote: “the very
reason the police wanted these records was to learn about the appellant’s lifestyle, i.e. the fact that
he was growing marihuana”.244
In Tessling, the biographical core of information was central in the SCC’s assessment. In
that case, police used a forward looking infrared (FLIR) device to take a heat image of the
accused’s home from an aircraft. Based on the information from that image and information from
informants, police were able to obtain a search warrant for the residence where they found a large
quantity of marihuana and several guns. Justice Binnie, writing for a unanimous Court, cited Plant
and explained that “not all information an individual may wish to keep confidential necessarily
enjoys s. 8 protection”.245 The judgment goes on to ask: “Did the FLIR heat profile expose any
intimate details of the respondent’s lifestyle or part of his core biological data?”246 The conclusion
was that:
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The information generated by FLIR imaging about the respondent does not touch
on “a biographical core of personal information”, nor does it “ten[d] to reveal
intimate details of [his] lifestyle.247
There was ultimately no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and therefore no
search for section 8 purposes.
Plant and Tessling demonstrate the use of the biographical core as a tool of analysis. In
both cases, the information (electricity consumption and heat profile) did not form part of the
biographical core or reveal intimate details of lifestyle. The fact that the information in question
was not part of the biographical core weighed heavily in favor of finding that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no constitutional protection. The significance of
the biographical core was at its height in these two cases. When used, the biographical core seems
to limit the scope of section 8 by restricting the type of information deserving of protection to that
which is intimate, personal and commonly considered private. To put it another way, when
information reveals a person’s biographical core, rather than mundane information, it attracts the
strongest privacy protections.248
The 2012 judgment of Cole is another example of the SCC using the biographical core a
part of the section 8 analysis. In Cole, a computer technician found child pornography on a
teacher’s work assigned laptop. The school gave the laptop to the police without a search warrant.
The question for the Court was whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
laptop’s contents such that police should have obtained a search warrant before they conducted
their examination. Both Justice Fish for the majority and Justice Abella in dissent found a breach
of section 8. The majority judgment begins with a statement that computers “contain information
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that is meaningful, intimate, and touching on the user’s biographical core”.249 This is developed
later in the judgment when Justice Fish explained:
The closer the subject matter of the alleged search lies to the biographical core of
personal information, the more this factor will favour a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Put another way, the more personal and confidential the information, the
more willing reasonable and informed Canadians will be to recognize the existence
of a constitutionally protected privacy interest.
Computers that are used for personal purposes, regardless of where they are found
or to whom they belong, "contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal
situations" (Morelli, at para. 105). This is particularly the case where, as here, the
computer is used to browse the Web. Internet-connected devices "reveal our
specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording in the browsing history and
cache files the information we seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet"
(ibid.).
This sort of private information falls at the very heart of the "biographical core"
protected by s. 8 of the Charter.250
The correlation between biographical core information and a reasonable expectation of privacy is
made obvious. When addressing the biographical core, it is significant to note that the Court was
clearly considering all the uses of the laptop, not just the child pornography that was found. This
is consistent with framing the issue in a neutral way. The SCC also presented the biographical
core more as a continuum; instead of as either biographical core or not. As a search gets closer to
the biographical core of information, the more likely the Court will recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, therefore, a constitutionally protected privacy interest.
3.4.2 The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Context is critical to every section 8 analysis. The SCC has often stressed the importance
of context. In Kang-Brown Justice Deschamps stated “because the requirement of a reasonable
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expectation of privacy is a guiding principle under s. 8, the consideration of relevant contextual
factors is an integral part of the s. 8 analysis”.251 As Justice Deschamps explained in Gomboc,
“context is crucial” to any section 8 analysis.252 In assessing the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy, the SCC looks to what it calls the “totality of the circumstances”. Through its different
manifestations, the SCC has repeatedly referenced the totality of the circumstances to set the
particular factual context for the search and decide whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy for each case. 253 This permits a fact specific determination within the flexible framework
provided by section 8.
The phrase “totality of the circumstances” was first articulated by the SCC in relation to
section 8 cases in the 1996 case of Edwards.254 In that case, Edwards was convicted for possession
for the purpose of tracking cocaine after police entered his girlfriend’s apartment on suspicion that
there may be crack cocaine inside. The question for the SCC was “What rights does an accused
person have to challenge the admission of evidence obtained as a result of a search of a third party’s
premises?” The issue was whether the accused had standing to assert his rights under section 8 of
the Charter with respect to the search of his girlfriend’s apartment. The analysis of that issue
included consideration of the accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The SCC set out the
principle as follows: “A reasonable expectation of privacy is to be determined on the basis of the
totality of the circumstances” and went on to provide:
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The factors to be considered in assessing the totality of the circumstances may
include, but are not restricted to, the following: (i) presence at the time of the search;
(ii) possession or control of the property or place searched; (iii) ownership of the
property or place; (iv) historical use of the property or item; (v) the ability to
regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude others from the place; (vi)
the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and vii) the objective
reasonableness of the expectation.255
This list of factors provided useful criteria for assessing the reasonableness of one’s privacy
expectations. Eleven years later, in Tessling, the SCC adapted the totality of the circumstances
test from Edwards to the circumstances of that case. Justice Binnie for a unanimous court
explained the use of this test as follows:
I will proceed on the basis of the “totality of the circumstances” test set out by Cory
J. in Edwards and the questions listed therein, at para. 45, but the questions need to
be tailored to the circumstances of the present case.
(1) Did the Respondent Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
On the facts of this case, we need to address:
1. What was the subject matter of the FLIR image?
2. Did the respondent have a direct interest in the subject matter of the
FLIR image?
3. Did the respondent have a subjective expectation of privacy in the
subject matter of the FLIR image?
4. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable? In this respect,
regard must be had to:
a. the place where the alleged "search" occurred;
b. whether the subject matter was in public view;
c. whether the subject matter had been abandoned;
d. whether the information was already in the hands of third parties;
If so, was it subject to an obligation of confidentiality?
e. whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the
privacy interest;
f. whether the use of surveillance technology was itself objectively
unreasonable;

255

Edwards, para 45.
52

g. whether the FLIR heat profile exposed any intimate details of the
respondent's lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature.256
After reviewing each of these factors, the judgement concluded that the accused had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information about patterns of heat distribution on the external surfaces
of his home.257
This totality of the circumstances test was employed in Kang-Brown by Justice Deschamps
in her reasons for judgement. Her restatement of factors reads:
To determine whether the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered. The accused must establish both
an objective and a subjective expectation of privacy. In Edwards, at para. 45, and
Tessling, at para. 32, this Court developed a non-exhaustive list of factors to assist
in making this determination. The factors for determining whether the accused had
a reasonable expectation of privacy may be summarized as including:
(i) the presence of the accused at the time of the alleged search;
(ii) the subject matter of the alleged search:
(a) ownership and historical use of the subject matter;
(b) whether the subject matter was in public view;
(c) whether the subject matter had been abandoned;
(d) where the subject matter is information, whether the information was
already in the hands of third parties; if so, was there a duty of confidentiality
in relation to it?
(iii) the place where the alleged search occurred:
(a) ownership, possession, control or use of the place where the alleged
search took place;
(b) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude
others from the place;
(c) notification of the possibility of searches being conducted in the place;
(iv) the investigative technique used in the alleged search:
(a) whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the alleged
privacy interest;
256
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(b) whether the information obtained in the alleged search exposed any
intimate details of the accused's lifestyle, or information of a biographical
nature.
As in any contextual analysis, not all the factors will be relevant in a given case.
The purpose of setting out a non-exhaustive list of factors stated in general terms is
not to have each one considered slavishly regardless of materiality to the specific
case, but to provide a helpful guide to ensure that relevant factors are not
disregarded.
In my view, because the requirement of a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
guiding principle under s. 8, the consideration of relevant contextual factors is an
integral part of the s. 8 analysis.258
It is interesting to note that this list of factors from Kang-Brown is not an exact copy of either
previous list provided in Edwards or Tessling. Justice Bastarache also asserts that “[e]stablishing
the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy requires an assessment of the “totality of the
circumstances” … and the specific factors to be considered must be tailored to the particular
case”.259 Because the test requires tailoring, one should expect some fluidity in the listing of
particular factors for each case. As Justice Binnie explained in M(A), “s. 8 jurisprudence will
continue to evolve as snooping technology advances. This flexibility is essentially what the
"totality of the circumstances" approach is designed to achieve.”260
In Patrick, the SCC used the totality of the circumstances as an analytical framework,
structuring the judgement around the Tessling factors.261 In Gomboc, Justice Deschamps’ reasons
for judgement were dependent on the totality of the circumstances.262 Justice Abella in her
concurring reasons and Justice McLachlin in dissent both also relied on the totality of
circumstances. Justice Abella simplified the factors as follows:
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… the subject matter of the information sought, whether the individual had a direct
interest in this subject matter, whether the individual had a subjective expectation
of privacy in the subject matter, and whether such an expectation of privacy in the
subject matter was also objectively reasonable.263
She then says the final inquiry regarding an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, “may
entail consideration of a wide array of relevant factors”.264 This particular reiteration of the totality
of the circumstances has since become the preferred version of the framework. For example, in
Cole, Justice Fish for the majority provided:
The "totality of the circumstances" test is one of substance, not of form. Four lines
of inquiry guide the application of the test: (1) an examination of the subject matter
of the alleged search; (2) a determination as to whether the claimant had a direct
interest in the subject matter; (3) an inquiry into whether the claimant had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and (4) an assessment as to
whether this subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, having
regard to the totality of the circumstances.265
The same four headings were used consistently by the SCC since Cole as can be seen in
Spencer,266 Jones267 and Marakah.268 These four factors are essentially a return to the Tessling
factors but without a listing of all the potential sub-factors under the fourth.

3.5 CONCLUSION
Section 8 of the Charter is intended to restrain government action and protect individuals
from unreasonable searches or seizures. The SCC’s approach to section 8 cases seems fairly
straightforward based on the above review – it is a normative inquiry to balance values using
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analytical tools created for that purpose. Informational privacy is recognized as a distinct sphere
of privacy. The purpose of section 8 is to prevent unjustified state intrusion on individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy. The reasonable expectation of privacy analysis looks at what
information ought to be protected. The SCC has explicitly rejected a risk analysis approach to
privacy. If a privacy interest is identified, the SCC then turns to a balancing of the individual
privacy interest with the State’s interest in the intrusion.
The SCC has identified that a biographical core of personal information is protected by
section 8.

They have used this tool of analysis at different points throughout section 8

jurisprudence. The Court has created a test to assess the reasonableness of any expectation of
privacy, called the totality of the circumstances. This test is meant to provide a contextual and
flexible framework. While the framework has been articulated in different ways throughout the
cases, the four factors as set out in Cole have remained consistent.
Now that the foundational principles have been outlined, chapter 4 can take a deeper and
more critical look at the Court’s approach to informational privacy through section 8 of the Charter
and addresses challenges it presents.
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CHAPTER 4: CHALLENGES WITH THE CURRENT
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Now that this thesis has explored what the law is, this chapter attempts to explain why there
are problems with the current state of section 8 jurisprudence and why the line between lawful and
unlawful searches of technology is so difficult to draw. I identify three specific issues with the
interpretation of section 8 with a view to examining the major challenges to achieving certainty.
The three issues reviewed in this chapter are: 1. Conceptual incompatibility between a stated
normative approach and the analytical tools employed, 2. Uncertainty prevalent in the
jurisprudence and 3. Relevant legislation.
Chapter 4 begins in section 4.2 explaining a foundational disconnect between the Court’s
normative approach and the positive analytical tools designed to assess a reasonable expectation
of privacy. This conceptual issue is discussed as the first challenge with the current interpretation
of section 8 of the Charter because it is central to all section 8 inquiries. The tools of analysis
introduced in chapter 3, section 3.4 – the biographical core and totality of the circumstances – are
positive, not normative. Section 4.2 explains how the normative privacy analysis gets confused
when approached with these factual inquiries. The cases of Spencer and Marakah are used to
demonstrate this point. In Spencer, the key element of the totality of the circumstances test – the
subject matter of the search – adds significant confusion to the already problematic analysis.
Marakah is used to demonstrate how the SCC focuses their attention on the positive indicators of
a reasonable expectation of privacy instead of conducting a normative analysis. A review of the
incompatibility shows that the core concern underlying all search and seizures cases is actually
dignity, which will be significant when I explore possible solutions to the challenges of section 8
in chapter 5.
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In addition to the foundational conceptual issue, in section 4.3 I discuss some practical and
more discrete problems of uncertainty with the jurisprudence.

The SCC contributes to an

uncertainty in section 8 through an inconsistent application of principles. The biographical core
is discussed in this section. While section 3.4 introduced the concept, section 4.3 explains how
the SCC has been inconsistent in its application; not only with when it is used, but what is included
within the biographical core. By using an ad hoc approach, leaving caveats within their judgments
and rendering split decisions, the SCC has left confusion in an area of the law that is meant to
prevent unjustified searches. Each of these ideas is explored within section 4.3.
To complete this chapter on the challenges with the current interpretation of section 8,
section 4.4 discusses how out of date legislation contributes to the problem of keeping pace with
searches of technology. Lastly, section 4.5 uses the Mills case as a demonstration of the challenges
identified within this chapter. Given the issues identified in this chapter, it should not be surprising
that there is no authoritative answer to my research question.

4.2 CONCEPTUAL INCOMPATIBILITY: A NORMATIVE APPROACH AND THE
ANALYTICAL TOOLS
4.2.1 The Incompatibility Explained
As outlined in chapter 3, section 3.2, the SCC has consistently held that a section 8 inquiry
into whether a person has an expectation of privacy “is a normative rather than descriptive
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standard”.269 The Court asks what information ought to be protected by section 8, not whether it
actually is protected.270
A normative approach addressed with positive tools creates a logical disconnect because
the two concepts are fundamentally different. A normative statement expresses a value judgment
about whether a situation is desirable or undesirable. Normative statements characteristically
contain verbs such as “should” or “ought to”. A normative question is one that asks, “what should
be”, which logically produces a subjective response. Normative statements are the opposite of
positive statements. Positive statements are objective statements that can be tested or rejected by
referring to evidence or facts. A positive question would ask instead “what is”.271
Instead of applying normative tools to the purportedly normative section 8 analysis, the
SCC have employed primarily positive analytical tools – the biographical core and totality of the
circumstances. Looking back to chapter 3, section 3.4, we know that the SCC considers section 8
to protect a biographical core of personal information, including information which tends to reveal
intimate details of lifestyle and personal choices and which individuals would wish to maintain
and control from disclosure to the State. Whether information is part of one’s biographical core
seems as though it would be primarily an objectively measurable device; with information being
either part of or not part of a biographical core. However, this seemingly factual question is not
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easy to apply and contains a normative element (would wish to) within its definition. As will be
discussed in section 4.3.2 below, the SCC has been inconsistent in the application of the
biographical core to section 8 cases.
In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of the
circumstances the Court has provided factors to consider, including: (i) the accused’s presence at
the time of the search, (ii) ownership, possession, control and historical use of the subject matter
of the search or the place of the search, (iii) whether the subject matter was in public view or
abandoned, (iv) whether the information was already in the hands of third parties. These are all
positive, factual and mostly binary questions. When considering searches of technology for
information these factors do not consider the relevant issues of privacy. For example, a person
will almost never be present at the time of a database search as the server containing the
information is likely in a physical location outside of the individual’s province or even State. 272
Individual’s do not have ownership, possession or control over the servers or the information,
which are by their nature in the hands of third parties – usually a corporation. Such an approach
to informational privacy questions is puzzling when part of a broad and purposive interpretation.
These factors in the totality of the circumstances test create a sterile review of the facts and miss
the real concerns of protecting information that ought to be protected and preventing unjustified
searches of that information. It is practically easier to employ these tools because they are
objectively measurable. However, the language used does not reflect or match what the Court
intends to do, nor does it address the real concerns of section 8 that genuinely motivate them,
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which will be discussed in detail below after the examples. This incongruity makes it difficult to
predict how the Court will apply section 8 considerations to emerging technology.
4.2.2 Examples of the Incompatibility
This incompatibility is prominently displayed in recent cases from the SCC dealing with
section 8 in the context of technology: Spencer and Marakah. I will outline these cases in detail
to demonstrate the incompatibly described above and also to show issues with the Court’s
approach to section 8 in technology cases. The Spencer judgment demonstrates that, within the
already problematic totality of the circumstances test, the defining of the subject matter of the
search often has a controlling interest in determining the result of the analysis. The Marakah
judgment demonstrates how the SCC has attempted to use factual considerations within the totality
of the circumstances analysis.
Spencer
In Spencer, police discovered child pornography in a shared folder on LimeWire, an online
file sharing program.273 LimeWire displayed the account user’s Internet Protocol (IP) address274
to other users as part of the file sharing process.275 Police did not know who was using the account
or where the computer was located. To link the IP address to a person and location, investigators
made a request to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) Shaw Communications (Shaw) for the name,
273
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address, and phone number of the IP address account holder as of August 31, 2007 at 1246 hours.276
Shaw provided the requested information which police used to obtain a search warrant for the
physical address associated with the IP address. When police executed the search warrant they
found 441 distinct images and 112 videos of child pornography downloaded on Mr. Spencer’s
computer and in its shared folder.277 They also learned that Spencer was not the Shaw subscriber;
that was Spencer’s sister, with whom Mr. Spencer resided. Mr. Spencer was identified as the
LimeWire account user and he was charged with possession of child pornography and making it
available to others through the internet.278
Spencer applied to have the evidence obtained as a result of the police obtaining the
subscriber information matching the IP address from Shaw excluded from his trial based on a
violation of his section 8 Charter rights. Spencer’s position was that police obtained the IP address
from Shaw without a warrant, making their actions an unreasonable search and seizure.279
In assessing Spencer’s application, Justice Foley at the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s
Bench reviewed the concept of reasonableness and held that “there is neither objective nor
subjective expectations of privacy in a subscriber’s name and address relating to the IP address
issued by the internet service”.280 Consequently, there was no search and no Charter breach.
Spencer was convicted of possession of child pornography and acquitted of making child
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pornography available. Both Spencer and the Crown appealed that decision.281 Spencer argued
that the trial judge erred in finding he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.282
The Court of Appeal found that because “Spencer was using his computer inside his home
to access child pornography, Mr. Spencer undoubtedly held a subjective expectation of privacy in
the Disclosed Information; but was his expectation objectively reasonable, having regard to the
totality of the circumstances?”283 Justice Caldwell defined the subject matter of the search more
broadly than Justice Foley based on its potential to reveal “intimate details of lifestyle and personal
choices of Mr. Spencer, and his activities within his home”.284 The court considered the terms of
the Service Agreement with Shaw as “relevant and material” to Spencer’s claim in having a
reasonable expectation of privacy.285 The terms of the policy made Spencer’s expectation of
privacy unreasonable.286 Using these positive factors, the Court of Appeal held that there was no
search in violation of section 8 of the Charter, even if there had been a search, it was reasonable
“in all respects” and did not violate the Charter.287 His appeal was dismissed. They also found
the trial judge erred in considering the mens rea of making child pornography available to others
and ordered a new trial on that charge.288
In separate reasons, concurring in result, Justice Ottenbreit did not agree with Justice
Caldwell’s characterization of the subject matter of the search. He explained:
In my view, the Disclosed Information in this case merely establishes the identity
of the contractual user of the IP address, who in this case was not the accused. The
281
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potential that the Disclosed Information might in this case eventually reveal much
about the individual and the individual's activity is, in my view, neither here nor
there.289
Justice Ottenbreit’s definition of the subject matter of the search as “name, address and telephone
number” is the same as the trial judge’s.290 Containment of the subject matter of the offence to
simply name, address and phone number influences the assessment and is important to the analysis.
The lower court decisions in Spencer reflect a larger uncertainty around how to characterize
the link to a name and address in the context of online activity. Spencer’s appeal to the SCC
allowed our highest court to provide clear direction on this controversial issue. The fact that there
were six interveners to the appeal demonstrate the significance of the outcome and its predicted
ramifications.291
It is important to review the positions of the parties and the interveners before examining
the judgment of the SCC to see how they tried to use measurable factors to make a normative
assessment. This background places the decision in context to understand the legal landscape at
the time just before Spencer was released. At the Supreme Court of Canada, Spencer argued:
The fundamental error committed by Caldwell, J.A. was to not appreciate the
significant impact of the disclosure of the subscriber information attached to an IP
address on one’s privacy rights. The Internet has created an unusual situation where
one can obtain a great deal of information about a particular user without
identifying that individual. The individual’s privacy rights are protected by
anonymity. Once the individual’s identity is provided his/her privacy rights are
significantly infringed.292
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His argument continued: “[t]he error of the Court of Appeal wasn’t that it applied the wrong test
but rather that it failed to appreciate the applicability of that test to online technology which
challenges our conventional concepts of possession and privacy.”293
In response, the Crown argued that Spencer’s view of privacy was far too expansive and
went beyond the actual search that occurred. The Crown’s position, as outlined in their factum,
provided:
To find a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information simply because it
has the potential, when combined with other information, to reveal deeper truths
about us, would cloak essentially everything in privacy. Search warrants would be
required for most every policy inquiry and other citizens and corporate citizens
would be improperly constrained from helping with law enforcement. That is
neither true to the ‘balancing’ which underlies s. 8, nor workable.294
The two parties to this litigation took very different approaches to the subject matter of the search.
Spencer’s position was that the Court should look at the implications of identifying a person
through their IP address while the Crown’s view was much more limited.
Before reviewing the judgement of the SCC, it is worthwhile to review the positions of the
interveners to see how this positive versus normative disconnect is apparent. Their viewpoints
were influential to the judgment and demonstrate the disagreement on the larger issues of privacy
in online activity. The Attorney General of Ontario premised its argument from a narrow approach
to the subject matter of the search:
In this case, the details the police requested from Shaw Communications were a
name and an address connected to an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated to
child pornography at one point in time. …. Under the direction of this Court's
strong line of cases from R. v. Plant to R. v. Cole, the proper analysis of the s. 8
claim should focus on the nature of the information obtained, and the details that it
alone provides. The sheet faxed by Shaw Communications did not reveal
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information tending to expose the appellant's intimate biographical details: it did
not identify the appellant at all. That should end the matter.295
The Attorney General of Ontario resorted to the biographical core of information and tried to say
that because the information at issue did not expose a biographical core of information it did not
fall within section 8 protection. This is a very positivist approach to the question, using facts to
determine the correct outcome.
The Attorney General for Alberta and the Director of Public Prosecutions took the same
position as the Attorney General for Ontario.296 Both Crown Interveners expressed serious
concerns to an approach that would recognize the police request to Shaw as being a search. As
the Attorney General for Alberta expressed:
If asking an internet service provider (ISP) for customer name and address is a
search, then so is virtually every other inquiry made of an institutional witness. To
characterize this routine police inquiry as a “search” would be a major departure
from existing jurisprudence, with unacceptable consequences for law
enforcement.297
…
If seeking trivial information from a commercial organization is an unreasonable
search, the consequences for policing and prosecution will be dire.298
…
If a warrant is required in the case at bar, warrants would likely also be required in
the above scenarios and countless others. The implications for police and court
resources are obvious.299
The Crown was concerned about the broader implications for police investigations if this case was
to expand the right to privacy provided under section 8 of the Charter. The Director of Public
Prosecutions warned the Court of the potential consequences of their decision:
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It takes little imagination to realize that a right to use the publicly accessible
segment of the Internet anonymously would make the Internet even more crimefriendly.300
Recognition of a general right to interact anonymously in public is simply
incompatible with society’s more compelling interest in protection and security.301
The proscription against identification flowing from the appellant’s proposed right
of anonymity must be so broad as to preclude police from even receiving clues
toward identification without a warrant. The breadth of the novel right of
anonymity claimed here evinces an attempt to use the Charter to advance
conditions most favorable to criminality.302
The Crown was concerned about what a right to anonymity could mean for crime prevention and
enforcement. This approach is framed in a normative way – the information should not be
protected because of broader public policy and security reasons.
The Interveners in support of Spencer’s position were the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association. They all argued that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber
information because it can in fact provide intimate details of an individual’s online activities.303
These interveners describe the privacy interest from the broader perspective of the potential
consequences of the search rather than the actual results of the search.304 Instead of conducting
the analysis based on the subscriber information of name, address and telephone number, the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association argued:
Internet browsing and surfing activities tend to reveal intimate details about a
person’s lifestyle and personal choices such that the consequences of lifting the
anonymity provided by an IP address are profound and widespread. As a result,
such information is subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy and the protection
of section 8 of the Charter. Because piercing the anonymity supplied by an IP
300
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address is the key to connecting an individual to their online activities, the CCLA
submits that section 8 of the Charter is engaged by such an intrusion.305
This approach relies on privacy protection through resorting to the biographical core analysis. The
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario advanced their argument from a similar starting
position:
Someone armed with this information can easily learn details of a person’s activities
on the internet, which can be extremely revealing. Access to this information should
therefore be judicially regulated under s. 8 and the police should not be able to obtain
it without a warrant.306

These interveners advocated for a recognition of the right to anonymity based on the fact that the
information can be revealing; claiming it was essential to ensuring privacy online.307 This is still
a positive approach looking to the factual and measurable activities at issue.
One theme stands out from a reading of the factums of the parties and interveners – the
recognition of the significance of this case. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association started their
factum with the statement that the “implications of this appeal are profound” since “the case has
much broader policy implications”.308 The Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario also noted
that this “is a watershed moment for the right to privacy”.309 The idea that this case would have
such a major impact was palpable. Either the Court would find there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy or not. There was no middle ground that would make all the parties happy given their
“markedly divergent perspectives” on defining the subject matter of the search.310
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The oral arguments of each party presented at the Supreme Court of Canada focused on
defining the subject matter of search as part of the totality of the circumstances test.311 Justices
LeBel expressed concerns about burying our heads in the sand on the potential information
available to police through an IP address. Justice Moldaver expressed concern with the Crown’s
“narrow and formalist view” of the subject matter of the search. The consistent message from the
bench during the hearing was a fear of the breadth of information available from an IP address.
The Justices were obviously troubled by the possibility of substantial intrusions into one’s online
activity that technology permits more generally.
On June 13, 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Spencer.312 Justice
Cromwell, writing for the unanimous court, started the reasons for judgment with the statement
that “The Internet raises a host of new and challenging questions about privacy. This appeal relates
to one of them.”313 The Court determined that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the subscriber information for his sister’s Internet Protocol (IP) address. In considering the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and ultimately whether there was a search, the subject matter of the search was defined broadly as
“the identity of a subscriber whose Internet connection is linked to particular, monitored Internet
activity”.314

The judgment then discusses the “nature of the privacy interest potentially

compromised by the state action”.315 Justice Cromwell explained:
The Court has previously emphasized an understanding of informational privacy as
confidentiality and control of the use of intimate information about oneself. In my
view, a somewhat broader understanding of the privacy interest at stake in this case
311
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is required to account for the role that anonymity plays in protecting privacy
interests online.316
This is the first indication that the Supreme Court of Canada may recognize anonymity as a part
of informational privacy protections. The judgment went on to provide that informational privacy
includes “privacy as secrecy, privacy as control and privacy as anonymity”.317 Justice Cromwell
discussed the idea of privacy as anonymity in the context of internet usage and explained that
“anonymity may, depending on the totality of the circumstances, be the foundation of a privacy
interest that engages constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure.”318 The
decision holds that “the police request to Shaw for subscriber information corresponding to
specifically observed, anonymous Internet activity engages a high level of informational
privacy.”319 The Court explicitly recognized anonymity as “an important safeguard for privacy
interests online”.320 The subscriber information was unconstitutionally obtained and therefore the
search of the residence, based on that information, was unlawful and violated section 8 of the
Charter.321 Ultimately, the evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) since admission of the
evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute; the conviction for possession
of child pornography was affirmed with the count of making child pornography available being
sent back for a new trial.322
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As set out earlier, on a section 8 application, a court must consider whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of the circumstances with reference to: (1) the
subject matter of the search; (2) the claimant's interest in the subject matter; (3) the claimant's
subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and (4) whether this subjective expectation
of privacy was objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances.323 The
“subject matter” of the search is central to the determination on a section 8 application. The
framing of the subject matter of the search informs the entire analysis and heavily influences the
result of the inquiry. It is problematic if the subject matter of the search is too narrowly defined
or too widely defined. In Spencer, the search at issue could have been defined as “a name and
address of someone in a contractual relationship with Shaw.”324 A name, address and telephone
number do not disclose intimate details giving rise to a heightened level of privacy protection. The
Court defined the subject matter of the search as “the identity of a subscriber whose Internet
connection is linked to particular, monitored Internet activity”. 325 By defining the subject matter
as a gateway to online activity, it attracted an expectation of privacy, and thus was a search within
the meaning of section 8. The same discussion was addressed in relation to the more recent case
of Marakah, which will be discussed in detail next. As one of the counsel from that case expressed:
This sort of context-specific analysis, which argued in favour of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in sent text messages, flowed directly from the way
McLachlin CJ characterized the issue at the outset of her analysis. The defense
essentially won the case when it won the issue-framing contest.326
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As Justice Cote expressed in Jones, properly defining the subject matter is “vital”.327
Different courts and parties strongly disagree on this underlying premise.

The divergent

perspectives of the parties to the Spencer case are an indication that the subject matter of the search,
a part of the totality of the circumstances test, has an inflated controlling interest in the result and
adds to the argument that the totality of the circumstances may not be the best analytical tool to
use for technology search cases. The Court in Spencer intended to answer the question of whether
persons should have privacy protection in their online activities including their association with an
IP address. Underlying the Court’s judgement is really the intention to protect a sphere of privacy
in our internet activity that allows for autonomy and freedom of expression.
Marakah
The SCC spent time in Marakah discussing the significance of control over information in
the section 8 analysis. In that case, Marakah had sent his accomplice incriminating text messages
about their illegal firearms transaction. The smartphones of Marakah and his accomplice were
seized by police and searched. The trial judge found that the search of Marakah’s home was invalid
and text messages from his smartphone could not be used against him. The question arose as to
whether the Crown could use the text messages recovered from his accomplice’s device, which
had also been obtained through an unlawful search.328 The trial judge answered this question in
the affirmative, finding Marakah had no standing with respect to the text messages on the other’s
device. The texts were admitted into evidence and Marakah was convicted. On appeal, the Court
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of Appeal found there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages and Marakah
had no standing to argue admissibility.
The question for the SCC was whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages sent to another person and whether Marakah could claim section 8 Charter protection
for text messages accessed through his accomplice’s smartphone. The Crown conceded that if the
SCC found that Marakah had standing, the search was unreasonable and a violation of section 8.
A majority of the SCC allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and entered an acquittal. Chief
Justice McLachlin writing for the majority found that Marakah subjectively believed his texts to
be private and that expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.329
As pointed out by Justice Rowe, concurring in separate reasons with Chief McLachlin’s
majority, the disagreement on the Court in Marakah was about the importance of control in the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.330 Chief Justice McLachlin for the majority stated that
“control is not an absolute indicator of a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor is lack of control
fatal to a privacy interest”.331 She explained:
Control is one element to be considered in the totality of the circumstances in
determining the objective reasonableness of a subjective expectation of privacy.
Control must be analyzed in relation to the subject matter of the search: the
electronic conversation. Individuals exercise meaningful control over the
information they send by text message by making choices about how, when, and to
whom they disclose the information.332
Justice Moldaver in dissent asserted control as a crucial factor.333 He explained his position as
follows:
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Here, Mr. Marakah had no control whatsoever over the text message conversations
on Mr. Winchester’s phone. Mr. Winchester had complete autonomy over those
conversations. He was free to disclose them to anyone he wished, at any time, and
for any purpose. To say that Mr. Marakah had a reasonable expectation of personal
privacy in the text message conversations despite his total lack of control over them
severs the interconnected relationship between privacy and control that has long
formed part of our s. 8 jurisprudence. It is equally at odds with the fundamental
principle that individuals can and will share information as they see fit in a free and
democratic society.334
Moldaver felt that the majority’s approach “threatens a sweeping expansion of section 8
standing”335 and risks “disrupting the delicate balance”.336 He concluded that Marakah had no
control and therefore no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the search.337
Even the parties focused at least some of their attention on these positive indicators of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, instead of conducting a normative analysis. The Crown argued that
Marakah lost control over the text message conversation.338
Whether someone maintains control over information at issue should not be a consideration
at all on a normative approach to section 8. On a normative inquiry, the question in Marakah is
whether people should be able to expect privacy in their text message conversations. The SCC
was actually concerned with the State gaining access to our personal text message conversations
without the proper authorization. On a normative analysis, control would not be a factor for
determining whether there should be privacy protections. Even if a person factually has a total
lack of control (such as in their data being held by a corporation) does not mean they cannot expect
any privacy protections.
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Marakah demonstrates that even when the SCC employs a positive question – such as
whether the accused had control over the information – the Justices disagree on the answer. They
are using the terminology of control but are actually concerned with whether privacy protection
should extend to text messages in a normative way. The confusion caused by this disconnect will
be exacerbated when it comes to technology because the boundaries between lawful and unlawful
are even harder to define.
In both Spencer and Marakah it is easy to see the normative intention underlying the
analysis, but the positive analytical tools do not adequately achieve the purpose of section 8. This
is why the Court faces difficulty in maintaining clarity and predictability. Unless the Court starts
to shift the discourse to reflect the real concerns of section 8, confusion will continue.
4.2.3 Dignity: The Core Concern of Section 8
The core concern underlying all search and seizures cases is dignity. The SCC has
repeatedly recognized that the main aim of section 8 is to protect individual dignity. In Dyment,
the SCC was concerned with the dignity of an individual when an agent of the State takes a
person’s blood without consent. Justice LaForest was clear that such a seizure was “a serious
affront to human dignity”.339 He went on to reference the Task Force on Privacy and Computers
as follows:
…. this sense of [informational] privacy transcends the physical and is aimed
essentially at protecting the dignity of the human person. Our persons are protected
not so much against the physical search (the law gives physical protection in other
ways) as against the indignity of the search, its invasion of the person in a moral
sense.340
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Again, he explained that “there is a privacy in relation to information. This too is based on the
notion of dignity and integrity of the individual”.341 In Plant, Justice Sopinka for the majority also
asserted that dignity is central to the purpose of section 8. As he explained, when the “dignity,
integrity and autonomy of the individual are directly compromised”, that is when the state has been
found to run afoul of the section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure.342 He articulated
the balancing within section 8 as being “societal interests in protecting individual dignity, integrity
and autonomy with effective law enforcement”.343 In Tessling, in holding that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat patterns emanating from the home, Justice Binnie
noted that its “disclosure scarcely affects the ‘dignity, integrity and autonomy’ of the person whose
house is subject of the FLIR image”.344 In Cole, Justice Fish for the majority stated that in the
context of a section 8 case, the focus is “on whether the search demeaned his or her dignity”.345
In the case of Fearon, the SCC was asked to consider whether section 8 was violated in the
search of a cell phone incident to arrest. Justice Cromwell for the majority set out new guidelines
for the police to follow in searching a cell phone incident to arrest. He explained that such a search
would be lawful if the arrest was lawful, the search of the cellphone was truly incidental to the
arrest and there was a valid reason for the search. Since the police who searched Fearon’s cell
phone did not meet this threshold, Justice Cromwell found there to be a section 8 violation. 346 In
her dissenting reasons, Justice Karakatsanis considered dignity as part of the analysis. She wrote:
Our Charter jurisprudence recognizes the concept of a "sphere of privacy" to define
the proper limits of state authority in a free and democratic society. It recognizes
that privacy – a sphere of protection for private life – is essential to personal
341
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freedom and dignity …. Privacy gives us a safe zone in which to explore and
develop our identities and our potential both as individuals and as participants in
our society.347
In holding that the search was unreasonable and the evidence should be excluded she stated:
The fact that a cell phone may keep and access meticulously taken records about
almost every aspect of a person's life explains both why searching it would be so
useful to law enforcement and why such a search may be so offensive to the person's
dignity.348
The idea that dignity underlies section 8’s purpose continues in the more recent cases of
Marakah349 and Jones.350 Clearly, dignity informs the Court’s analysis more than whether an
accused maintains possession or control of the information and is present at the time of the search.
The positive tools of analysis created to address section 8 cases do not address the normative
underlying concern for dignity as expressed by the Court.
In addition to this foundational disconnect problem within section 8 jurisprudence, there is
further uncertainty.

4.3 UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE JURISPRUDENCE
This section reviews some practical and more concrete problems of uncertainty within the
section 8 jurisprudence. In addition to the inherent uncertainty, inconsistency, caveats and split
judgments leave confusion as a constant theme.
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4.3.1 Uncertainty Inherent within Section 8
The SCC has repeatedly acknowledged that while the language of section 8 may be simple,
it is inherently imprecise.351 In one of the most contentious section 8 cases dealing with sniffer
dog searches, Justice Binnie stated that “[s]ection 8 has proven to be one of the most elusive
Charter provisions despite the apparent simplicity of its language”.352 Hunter v Southam
recognized that the guarantee provided by section 8 is “vague and open”.353 This permits flexibility
but at the cost of certainty.354 The foundational analytical concept for any section 8 analysis is “a
reasonable expectation of privacy”. The phrase “unreasonable search and seizure” requires an
understanding of “unreasonable”. Yet, the meaning of the terms “unreasonable” and “reasonable”
are open to a variety of valid, competing interpretations. What is “reasonable” changes over time.
Privacy itself is a fluctuating concept.355 These are extremely difficult terms to define with any
precision.356
The concept of privacy is constantly evolving and has blurred “reasonableness”
boundaries.357 Privacy is a vague social construct that can be defined in a number of different
ways. There is no set of neutral, inevitable or objective principles to define what privacy means.
Philosophical approaches to the study of privacy have focused on the normative questions around
whether privacy is a right, a good in itself, or an instrumental good.358 Economic approaches to
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privacy have centered around the value, in economic terms, of privacy.359 Sociological approaches
have emphasized the ways in which the collection and use of personal information reflect and
reinforce relationships of power.360 Privacy’s inherent uncertainty allows for wide discretion in its
application.
Furthermore, not all privacy problems are equal. What is “reasonable” in one situation
will not be directly transferrable to another fact scenario. And what is “private” in one context
will not necessarily be considered private in another.361 In assigning meaning to these terms,
judges “will inevitably be influenced by their own social, economic and political values.”362 The
inherent uncertainty allows for wide discretion in the application of section 8. How the SCC
defines “privacy” and “reasonable expectation” are value-laden decisions, ones that greatly impact
the protection afforded by section 8 to all Canadians.363
The inherent uncertainty of section 8 is evidenced by the regularity of strongly divided
judgments.364 This fracturing shows that Justices at Canada’s highest court cannot reach clear
conclusions based on the section 8 analysis. In the confusion of split judgments, how are police
expected to know the law and anticipate how it will develop in the future with emerging
technology?
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4.3.2 Inconsistent Application of the Biographical Core
The vague concepts of “biographical core”, “tends to reveal” and “intimate details” leave
open a variety of interpretations and there has been confusion in its application.365 The use of the
biographical core as a tool of analysis has been uneven, leading to uncertainty about its exact
meaning and its importance in assessing whether section 8 protection is triggered.366
The Court of Appeal judgement from Patrick is an example of this point. In that case, the
accused was suspected of operating an ecstasy lab from his home. On several occasions police
took garbage bags that had been placed out for collection but were inside the accused’s property
line. Based on the evidence found in his garbage, police obtained a search warrant for his house
and charged him with unlawfully producing, possessing and trafficking ecstasy. Patrick argued
that the police search of his garbage was unreasonable within the meaning of section 8. He was
convicted at trial. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeal held that the items found in the
garbage revealed that the accused “was involved in criminal activity and little else.” Therefore,
they held the items “cannot constitute intimate details of lifestyle or core biographical details to
which privacy protection ought to be extended.”367 The Court of Appeal majority essentially used
the biographical core tool as a threshold. In contrast, the dissenting judgement from the Court of
Appeal found that “the garbage disclosed information about the appellant’s lifestyle and personal
choices which led the police to draw conclusions about what the appellant was doing inside his
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house.”368 The dissent found a section 8 breach and would have dismissed the charges. This
demonstrates uncertainty around defining the biographical core and what is included within it.
Even at the SCC, within one case, there is disagreement on whether to even use the
biographical core as part of the section 8 analysis. In 2010, the SCC had the opportunity to use
the biographical core analysis in R v Gomboc where the utility company cooperated with a police
request to install a digital recording ammeter (DRA).369 Based on the data collected from the
DRA, police discovered a pattern of electrical power consistent with a marihuana grow operation
and subsequently obtained a search warrant for the residence. Gomboc challenged the search
based on section 8 of the Charter. The question for the SCC was whether Gomboc had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information about the pattern electricity use disclosed by the
DRA. Justice Deschamps, writing for the majority in the result, used the biographical core as a
tool of analysis. She looked at the totality of the circumstances including, the nature and quality
of the information, its “remoteness from the ‘biographical core of personal information” and the
legislative scheme in place.370

She found that this investigative technique revealed the

consumption of electricity; nothing about intimate or core personal activities of the occupants.371
Justice Deschamps explained that:
Determining the expectation of privacy requires examination of whether disclosure
involved biographical core data, revealing intimate and private information for
which individuals rightly expect constitutional privacy protection.372
As such, she framed the question as a biographical core issue when she went on to write:
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This brings us to the central issue in this case: whether the DRA discloses intimate
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual that form part of the
biographical core data protected by the Charter's guarantee of informational
privacy.373
As result of this approach, that there was no foundation for concluding that the disclosure of
information revealed any information about household activities of an intimate or private nature;
there was nothing that formed part of the biographical core of information deserving of section 8
protection.374 Justice Deschamps also expressed the view that the DRA revealed “very little about
what is taking place in the home”.375 She concluded her reasons on the informational privacy
interest with this statement:
Considerations relevant to the informational privacy analysis therefore lead to the
conclusion that no expectation of privacy in the electricity consumption
information was objectively reasonable. Disclosing information about electricity
consumption is not invasive nor revelatory of the respondent's private life. It does
not yield anything meaningful in terms of biographical core data that attracts
constitutional protection.376
Justice Abella concurred in the result with Justice Deschamps but did so because she found
the regulatory scheme determinative.

Justice Abella specifically disagreed with Justice

Deschamps’ conclusion that DRA is not revelatory of activities within the home.377 Yet she held
that Gomboc could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electric consumption
information when the legislation specifically allowed disclosure of customer information to peace
officers.378 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for herself and Justice Fish, dissenting in the result,
disagreed with the majority’s restricted understanding of what constitutes a biographical core of
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information. Instead, she took a broader view and reasoned that a search does not have to produce
conclusive determinations of activities within a home to be intrusive. She found that by making
informed predictions of probable activities in the home, the information conveyed useful private
information about an individual’s lifestyle which should have attracted a reasonable expectation
of privacy and section 8 protection, such that a warrant should have been obtained.379 In fact,
while the biographical core was used by the majority cohort of four in Gomboc as a threshold for
section 8 informational privacy protection, it was not used by Justice Abella in her concurring
judgment for three members of the Court nor the dissent of Chief Justice McLachlin written for
two Justices, meaning more Justices of the court did not employ biographical core as the threshold
for asserting section 8 protection.
As Professor Don Stuart aptly notes in his annotation, the Gomboc case reveals “strong
divisions and uncertainty on the Court as to how to approach section 8 claims, particularly as to
the triggering requirement of a reasonable expectation of privacy.”380 Deschamps’ reasoning is
reflective of Tessling, using the biographical core essentially as a yardstick. However, neither the
concurring decision of Justice Abella nor the dissent of Chief Justice McLachlin used the
biographical core in their assessments of the case. Therefore, most of the court did not use the
biographical core in their reasoning and came to their conclusions through other means. 381
Within the biographical core tool of analysis, the SCC has created further ambiguity to
understanding the scope of the biographical core. In Plant, Justice Sopinka approached the
biographical core as including “intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
379
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individual”382 whereas in Tessling, Justice Binnie presented the biographical core as something
different than and distinct from intimate details of lifestyle.383 In Gomboc, Justice Deschamps
included intimate details within the “biographical core”.384
What is included within a biographical core is unknown and confusing. The term “core”
suggests that it should include only the central or fundamental aspects. A biographical core would
therefore only reasonably include a narrow aspect of one’s lifestyle; not be expanded to include
personal preferences or likings. For example, if a person is obsessed with tennis – they watch
every match, have all the memorabilia and spend their time and money on the sport – that does not
form part of their biographical core. In the same way, if a person is a drug dealer and sells illegal
substances from their home, that is a part of their lifestyle but cannot be said to raise to the level
of becoming a part of their biographical core. As a tool of analysis for determining what should
attract section 8 protection, the biographical core ought to be a narrow construction of personal
information.
Throughout its irregular consideration, the SCC has sometimes included criminality as part
of the biographical core analysis. In Wong, Justice LaForest for the majority held that the question
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy “cannot be made to depend on whether
or not those persons were engaged in illegal activities.” He rejected the use of ex post facto
reasoning and subsequent validation for searches.385 Criminality was placed outside consideration
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as a piece irrelevant to the analysis. However, Justice Lamer, in separate reasons, took a different
view as to where criminality fits into the analysis. He explained:
I agree that such surveillance will violate s. 8 where the target of the surveillance
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, in my view, the consideration
of whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy can only be
decided within the particular factual context of the surveillance, not by reference to
a general notion of privacy in a free and democratic society which an individual
enjoys at all times… Whether such an expectation is reasonable will depend on the
particular circumstances; a person does not necessarily enjoy this right in all
circumstances. It is sufficient to decide this case by considering whether the
appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this hotel room which had been
effectively converted into a public gaming-house.386 [emphasis added]
Justice Lamer was including the fact of criminality into his consideration as part of the
circumstances.
When Plant created the biographical core as a tool of analysis, the majority did not consider
the computerized electricity records to reveal a biographical core of information, even though they
provided police with information about illegal activities discovered upon the search (a marihuana
grow operation). However, in separate reasons, Chief Justice McLachlin expressly included
criminality as part of the lifestyle of the accused: “The very reason the police wanted these records
was to learn about the appellant's personal lifestyle, i.e. the fact that he was growing marihuana.”387
Since Plant, other decisions have taken the view that criminal activity is part of the lifestyle of an
accused person; expanding the biographical core and thus what will be protected under the
principle of informational privacy. Like Chief Justice McLachlin in Plant, in Kang-Brown Justice
Deschamps expressed:
The right to informational privacy protects biographical information, including the
very nature of the information. In a case involving this right, the relevant elements
386
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of informational privacy include intimate personal details about an accused, such
as his or her having come into contact with a controlled substance either as a drug
trafficker, an illegal drug user or a legal drug user (such as a user of marijuana for
medicinal purposes), or by being in the company of drug users. The very personal
nature of this information suggests that the appellant had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.388 [emphasis added]
This approach treats drug use or trafficking as part of one’s biographical core. Justice Bastarache
also treated the information about the contents of the appellant’s bag as “within this biographical
core”.389
The SCC marked a shift away from consideration of the biographical core in its reasoning
in Spencer. The biographical core was mentioned in the Spencer decision but only in passing and
was not engaged by the SCC in its section 8 analysis.390 The only time a biographical core of
information was even mentioned in argument in the most recent case of Mills was in passing by
the intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia.391 Clearly the parties did not think it was
worth employing this tool of analysis. As Professors Hunt and Rankin point out, this lack of
engagement by both the Court and the parties “serves to minimize the concept’s overall importance
in the section 8 analysis”.392
Then in 2017, the SCC was asked whether the sender of text messages, accessed through
the recipient’s device, has section 8 protection over such messages. In that case, Marakah, Chief
Justice McLachlin, now for the majority, returned to Plant and asserted: “The purpose of s. 8 is
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‘to protect a biographical core of personal information”.393 She fully accepted criminality as part
of the consideration of lifestyle for the biographical core analysis. She explained that:
The medium of text messaging broadcasts a wealth of personal information capable
of revealing personal and core biological information.394
And held:
The mere fact of the electronic conversation between the two men tended to reveal
personal information about Mr. Marakah's lifestyle; namely, that he was engaged
in a criminal enterprise.395
Ultimately the evidence was excluded after holding that Marakah has standing to challenge the
search of an electronic conversation between him and the co-conspirator. Clearly the SCC includes
criminality as part of the biographical core.
The biographical core has an uncertain place in the section 8 analysis. It has never been
precisely defined. It has been unclear from its conception in Plant. As it is today, the biographical
core analysis will not help the SCC going forward with respect to emerging technologies because
the concept is unstable and the information at issue too diverse. Unless the biographical core is
clearly defined or expressly rejected as a tool of analysis, lower courts, police, crown, and all
justice system participants will suffer.
4.3.3 Case-by-Case Approach and Caveats
The purpose of section 8 is to prevent unjustified state intrusions before they happen.396
This preventative purpose is disregarded by the SCC when they provide for caveats and adopt a
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case-by-case approach. As an example, in M(A) Justice Binnie provided a qualification to sniffer
dog searches when he said:
If the lawfulness of a search is challenged, the outcome may depend on evidence
before the court in each case about the individual dog and its established
reliability.397 [emphasis added]
The stipulation that the evidence in each case may determine the lawfulness of the search is not
wrong. But without more direction, it leaves the search area inexact. Similarly, Justice Moldaver
in Telus stated:
I would not go so far as to conclude that a general warrant can never prospectively
authorize the delivery of future private communications to the police on a continual
basis over a substantial period of time.398 [emphasis added]
He did not go on to say when this may be possible in some scenario and it is unclear why he would
leave such a caveat in that case. Leaving this type of statement in the judgment removes the
certainty of the statement that a general warrant cannot authorize prospective production of future
text messages. Law enforcement are left thinking they may have that case where a general warrant
may apply since it was not decisively removed as an option. Again in Vu, Justice Cromwell
apparently did not want to make a conclusive statement about computer searches. He explained:
It is not my intention to create a regime that applies to all computers or cellular
telephones that police come across in their investigations, regardless of context. As
the respondent correctly points out, police may discover computers in a range of
situations and it will not always be appropriate to require specific, prior judicial
authorization before they can search those devices.399 [emphasis added]
This statement provides that police do not always need preauthorization before searching
computers or cell phones. Justice Cromwell could easily have stated that the police do require
preauthorization unless there are certain conditions or situations. Instead he left a caveat and did
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not provide a “regime”. In Fearon, Justice Cromwell for the majority again did not take the
opportunity to establish a clear rule and instead wrote: “I do not suggest that these measures
represent the only way to make searches of cell phones incident to arrest constitutionally
compliant”.400 More recently in Marakah, Justice McLachlin for the majority dealt with whether
the sender of a text message held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sent text messages on
the recipient’s device. She held that there was such an expectation of privacy but left a caveat:
The conclusion that a text message conversation can, in some circumstances, attract
a reasonable expectation of privacy does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that
an exchange of electronic messages will always attract a reasonable expectation of
privacy … whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a conversation is
present in any particular case must be assessed on those facts by the trial judge.401
[emphasis in original]
Further in her reasons, she again provided:
I conclude that in this case, Mr. Marakah had standing under s. 8 of the Charter.
This is not to say, however, that every communication occurring through an
electronic medium will attract a reasonable expectation of privacy and hence grant
an accused standing to make arguments regarding s. 8 protection. This case does
not concern, for example, messages posted on social media, conversations
occurring in crowded Internet chat rooms, or comments posted on online message
boards. On the facts of this case, Mr. Marakah had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the electronic conversation accessed through Mr. Winchester's device;
different facts may well lead to a different result.402
The continual allowance for caveats leaves an absence of bright lines for police to respect.
The Court cannot practically expect law enforcement to be able to prevent unjustified searches
before they happen without clarity in the law. Leaving section 8 search issues to be deciphered on
a case-by-case basis without clear guidance from the Court creates foreseeable problems, which
will ultimately come back to the courts. Litigants will continue to argue opposing yet rational
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views. In fact, in some cases the Court actually finds a breach of section 8 but allows the evidence
to be admissible because of the uncertainty in the law.403
4.3.4 Split Decisions leave Confusion
The seemingly straightforward statement provided in section 8 of the Charter has proven
to be highly contested. Justices at the SCC are often divided in their reasons404 and litigants are
regularly joined by interveners405 expressing disagreement on the issues. It seems as though
developing technology has added to the confusion.406
Split decisions reveal continuing strong divisions and uncertainty on the SCC as to how to
approach section 8 cases. Split judgements have made the “majority” hard to find.407 For example,
in Gomboc there were three sets of reasons: 1. Justice Deschamps writing for herself, Charron,
Rothstein, and Cromwell; 2. Justice Abella writing for herself, Binnie and LeBel, concurring in
the result with Justice Deschamps; and, 3. Chief Justice McLachlin for herself and Fish, in dissent.
The split was 4-3-2. Within this case, there was a 7-2 split on the result to allow the appeal and
restore the convictions. Justice Deschamps and Justice Abella’s reasons arrived at the same
conclusion – that police can get DRA records without a warrant – but by different routes.
However, a different split is found when considering the use of the biographical core. Justice
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Deschamps used the biographical core as a yardstick and her reasons are considered the “majority”
judgement. Yet, it was not used by Justice Abella in her concurring judgment for three members
of the SCC nor the dissent of Chief Justice McLachlin written for herself and Justice Fish; meaning
a majority of the court did not employ biographical core as the threshold for asserting section 8
protection, thus leaving the impression that the biographical core is of limited use to a section 8
analysis for informational privacy. This 5-4 split on use of the biographical core creates confusion.
In the sniffer dog search cases of M(A) and Kang-Brown, the SCC released fragmented
judgements with four separate sets of reasons in each case (the split was 4:2:2:1 in both). In KangBrown, Justice Binnie recognized that the cases had “polarized” the court.408 Split judgements
reflect indecisiveness from the SCC. The lack of clarity from Canada’s top court offers no clear
direction to law enforcement. The goal of preventing unjustified searches requires clarity in the
law for both law enforcement and counsel. Continuing strong divisions from the SCC on how to
approach section 8 claims make it difficult for advisory crown and defense to advise their clients
and for Canadians to know the limits of law enforcement. If defense counsel and crown counsel
do not have clear direction, the result is more litigation and less resolution of cases for courts that
are already overburdened.
It is difficult to follow section 8 case law development and predict the outcome on an issue
when there is such a lack of certainty. This makes it a challenge to prevent breaches when one
cannot foresee how a judgment will split and where the majority will fall. When police are left
with lengthy split judgments, it is difficult to understand exactly what the law is. How is the Court
going to handle new technology coming when they cannot even agree on how to treat utility
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records?409

With emerging IoTs and new technologies, these problems will only become

exacerbated. They may get worse before they get better if the SCC does not recognize their own
inconsistency in approaches to technological section 8 cases. Other than forcing the Court to
release only one set of reasons, the solution is likely an overhaul of our understanding of section
8 privacy law as outlined in chapter 5.

4.4 RELEVANT LEGISLATION IS OUT OF DATE
A discussion of search and seizure law is not complete without discussing the relevant
legislation. Much of the applicable legislation is outdated and must be contorted to apply to
technology that did not exist when it was drafted. At the time Part VI of the Criminal Code and
search warrant provisions were created, no one was thinking of the upcoming IoTs. Technology
develops at a pace which makes it effectively impossible for legislation to keep up. Many times,
courts must apply definitions from the Criminal Code and make them fit circumstances that were
not envisioned by the legislative drafters. For example, section 342.1(2) defines “computer
system” as “a device that, or group of interconnected or related devices one or more of which, (a)
contains computer programs or other computer data, and (b) by means of computer programs, (i)
performs logic and control, and (ii) may perform any other function”. 410 This definition does not
need amending in order to apply to gadgets that make up the IoTs. Smart home appliances would
meet that definition without any need for mental gymnastics. In contrast, section 183 of the
Criminal Code defines “private communication” as:
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any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator
who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is
in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the
originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the
person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based
telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose
of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by
the originator to receive it. [emphasis added]
This definition includes both an intention and human element. When someone interacts with
technology, can that gadget be considered a person or to have intention? For example, can your
conversation with Alexa or Siri fit within the definition of “private communication” so as to attract
Part VI protections against interception and section 8 Charter protection. If the answer is no, can
police listen in on people talking to their technology? Based on the definition alone it seems
possible, yet the SCC’s generous approach to informational privacy suggests they would find a
reasonable expectation of privacy in such devices. We have seen the SCC’s reaction where
legislation does not fit the technology precisely in Telus. There the Court dealt with Part VI
interception legislation. The majority in Telus effectively expanded the definition of intercept of
private communications to adapt to technological development of text messages.411
If police seized records from an Alexa device, how would the SCC frame the subject
matter? It would certainly depend on whether Alexa would be considered a person for purpose of
“private communication”. The subject matter could be a private conversation in the person’s home
or a person’s one-way verbal commands to technology. What about when the issue deals with
smart appliances, such as our coffee pots and fridge. Do police require a search warrant or
production order or would they require a Part VI authorization if these gadgets use voice
command? Where would wearable technology fit in? FitBits and smartwatches do not clearly fit
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the definition of “private communication” but the information available through that technology
is highly revealing.

4.5 THE MILLS HEARING AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE CHALLENGES
The most recent section 8 case to be heard at the SCC is that of Mills. It demonstrates the
confusion at the SCC when trying to apply section 8 to an online child luring fact scenario. In
Mills, a police officer created a fictitious Facebook profile appearing as a 14-year-old girl. Over
the course of two months Mills, a 31-year old man, communicated with this undercover officer
through thousands of messages which were captured by an online tool called Snag-It.412 The trial
judge had found that the police should have obtained prior judicial authorization through Part VI
of the Criminal Code before seizing the messages.413 He went on to find that the evidence was
obtained contrary to section 8 of the Charter but did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2).
Mills was convicted of online child luring. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal
found that Part VI of the Criminal Code did not apply and determined that Mills did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages. The SCC was asked whether Mills had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications such that their seizure was a breach of
section 8 of the Charter. One would think this should be a relatively easy question to answer given
the Court’s voluminous case law and experience on the subject. Yet when one watches the hearing
before our highest court, one is left with the distinct impression that no one really knows what is
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going on. It is not just that there is disagreement on the result or conclusion of the case, there is
confusion surrounding how to frame the issue and from which viewpoint to start the discussion.
There were 9 interveners to the case at the SCC.414 Counsel for Mills started the hearing
with the statement that the Mills case was the “first opportunity for this court to be able to develop
a principled, purposive, workable approach to covert, proactive, online investigations” … “with
some clear guidance to police investigations so that counsel, police and judges will know clearly
what the rules are”.415 Counsel went on to argue that the appellant maintained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the communications and suggested that Part VI of the Criminal Code
was the answer to the section 8 breach. The second counsel for Mills began his comments with
the statement “we’re on the beginning of a new frontier” … “people’s privacy is under siege”. 416
Justice Abella responded,
But isn’t social media, can’t we look at social media as the voluntary donation of
privacy to a public space? … before we say, I believe we have to make distinctions,
don’t we have to make distinctions between the various kinds of technological
places from which we draw this information and I’d be hard pressed to think social
media as being privacy protected, it should be, but it isn’t… How can we conclude
they have even a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy? 417
The confusion surrounding whether there is any expectation of privacy continued throughout the
hearing. Almost all of the Justices had questions about the reasonable expectation of privacy.
Justice Brown said “I’m struggling to understand how that could possibly be the subject of a
reasonable expectation of privacy”.418 Justice Abella asked whether one party to a conversation
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can have a reasonable expectation of privacy but the other person does not. 419 Justice Moldaver
questioned how an investigation for child luring would ever get started if the police required a Part
VI authorization and referenced the need for legislation.420 Justice Karakatsanis asked whether
there could be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a discussion with an undercover police officer
and whether the officer could testify as to the conversation. 421 The fact that very basic questions
are being asked on section 8 law by the Justices of the SCC is concerning. It seems as though
there is more uncertainty than one would expect for an area of the law with over 30 years of
jurisprudence.
The Crown’s position was that there should be no reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications that constitute a crime against the recipient.422 The problem with that approach,
as identified by Justice Karakatsanis and Justice Brown is that is an ex post facto determination.423
However, Justice Moldaver said the obvious answer is that there could be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in this situation.424 Even the basic question of whether there was a search
or seizure was debated.425 Each of the Crown interveners argued that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore section 8 was not engaged.
There was an obvious and complete lack of agreement on the foundational points between
the parties throughout the case at the SCC. The Justices engaged with the parties with questions
and discussion throughout the hearing indicating their lack of clarity on the issues. I think there
is so much confusion because of the three points identified above – conceptual incompatibility
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between the normative approach and the analytical tools employed, uncertainty prevalent in the
jurisprudence and outdated legislation.
Because of the conceptual disconnect between the intended normative approach and the
positive tools of analysis, the parties and the Justices were not able to engage in discussion of the
essential values and purpose of section 8. They instead discussed control over the messages and
the fact that it was a stranger relationship. The only time the biographical core was mentioned in
the hearing was in passing by the intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia.426 If there
was clarity on when and how to use the biographical core as an analytical tool for section 8 cases,
the parties could have relied on it. Part VI of the Criminal Code was arguably the answer for the
case, but because the legislation is out of date with the technology of Facebook and SnagIt, even
that was disputed.

The trial judge decided that an authorization to intercept private

communications under Part VI should have been obtained before seizing the messages. The
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal disagreed.

How the SCC will address the

legislation’s applicability remains unknown, with judgment expected in the Fall of 2018. Mills
reflects the current state of section 8 law and it is not a pretty picture.

4.6 CONCLUSION
Section 8 jurisprudence suffers from three main disfunctions. There is a conceptual
disconnect in how the SCC has approached the normative analysis with positive analytical tools.
The cases of Spencer and Marakah were used to detail how the use of the positive tools
(biographical core and totality of the circumstances test) do not match the concerns that genuinely
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motivate them (normative analysis). This incongruity makes it difficult to know how the Court
will apply section 8 principles to the next case. In addition to this foundational problem, further
uncertainty is apparent. Uncertainty is inherent in the imprecise language of section 8. It is hard
to define the boundaries of privacy when such subjective terms are used. There has been an
inconsistent application of the biographical core, having its inexact meaning inconsistently
applied. The Court’s willingness to resort to caveats, use an ad hoc approach and render split
decisions compounds the uncertainties within section 8 law. Lastly, outdated legislation is forced
to apply to situations that it did not foresee, causing further uncertainty and confusion.
Of course, one needs to recognize the practical limitations of the SCC. They are a reactive
body. As an appellate court, they do not have the experts or evidence they may want or need. In
addition, the nature of the appellate process does not fit well with rapidly changing technology.
Technology at issue in an investigation that comes before the SCC is likely outdated by the time
the case reaches its conclusion.427 The current state of section 8 law is difficult to implement and
risks future Charter violations. The resulting police uncertainty does not help in the effort to
prevent privacy breaches.
Considering the challenges identified with the current section 8 jurisprudence, it is not
surprising that there is no authoritative answer on how to draw the line between lawful and
unlawful searches of technology in criminal investigations. The SCC has been trying to contort
the positive analytical tools for section 8 into a normative analysis. They are also trying to apply
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that problematic section 8 jurisprudence to current technologies. The next chapter will suggest
how the law should be modified to bring greater legal certainty.

99

CHAPTER 5: MAKING SENSE OF SECTION 8
FOR SEARCHES OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter recommends a way forward for the SCC to better address searches of
technology within section 8 parameters. I outline four possible options open to the Court. Each
one is meant to minimize the confusion within section 8 jurisprudence. The first option is to
continue on the current course of action with no change. The problems identified in chapter 4
would be ignored and the Court would continue conducting business as usual. The second option
is to revisit the risk analysis approach. There are benefits to the risk analysis, such as certainty
and predictability to be considered. For the third option, I outline a spectrum of privacy protection
for the Court to consider employing in section 8 cases dealing with technology. I propose three
categories for technology based upon four criteria: intrusiveness, specificity, accuracy and the type
of detail involved in the search. The first three of these four criteria are adapted from the SCC’s
sniffer dog cases, Kang-Brown and M(A). As will be explained, the fourth criteria adds the element
necessary to deal with technology. Each proposed category of technology would have specialized
processes and requirements for searches requiring different levels of prior judicial authorization.
These categories could prove to be useful with emerging technologies and benefit from
predictability.
The last option I outline for consideration is a move beyond privacy for section 8
protection. Instead of only privacy, the Court could shift the dominant discourse to that of dignity,
measuring any infringements with a normative lens. Dignity is a concept not unknown to the
SCC’s Charter jurisprudence and does come with its own challenges. Section 5.5.2 will explore
how dignity can be used to develop the Court’s approach to section 8 cases. This proposed new
framework for the analysis of section 8 cases includes expanding section 8 Charter protection in
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an understandable and authentic way. It would provide clarity and certainty to law enforcement
in the context of criminal investigations when they consider whether a search of technology is
lawful or unlawful.
Each of these options will now be outlined as I consider and reject options 1 through 3 to
argue in favour of a dignity approach to section 8.

5.2 MAINTAIN STATUS QUO
There is always obviously the option for the SCC to keep things the way they currently are
and have section 8 jurisprudence develop along without any serious change. Unfortunately, it is
likely that keeping things the same will exacerbate the problems identified in this thesis as
technology develops.

Foreseeable issues include how the Court will address emerging

technologies that will inevitably come before the SCC for consideration. As outlined in chapter
2, section 2.7, technology is more commonly being used as a tool for committing criminal acts.
Technology applications and online services are promoting anonymity and secrecy as a feature to
their products which stifle law enforcement efforts to investigate crimes on the dark web. The
concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy is problematic because it employs analytical tools
that are inconsistently applied and frames the question in a positive (instead of normative) way. A
reasonable expectation of privacy is vague and uncertain as outlined in chapter 4, section 4.3.
Maintaining this threshold concept in a world with dynamically changing norms is concerning.
Law enforcement will most certainly want to take advantage of the growing world of the
IoTs as part of their criminal investigations. With the current state of section 8 jurisprudence, they
are faced with few concrete answers on lawful parameters to such searches. As our highest court,
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the SCC has a responsibility to ensure predictability of section 8 in an effort to prevent unjustified
searches. That reasonability cannot be fulfilled by maintaining the current situation. While this is
an option, it is not a good one and should be rejected in favour of action.

5.3 RECONSIDER RISK ANALYSIS
The Court could reconsider using the risk analysis for section 8 cases. Instead of using a
normative and neutral approach, they would be concerned with protecting only actual privacy.
The starting point for the risk analysis “is the proposition that the person who divulges any
confidence always runs the risk that his interlocutor will betray the confidence”.428 This approach
to section 8 benefits from predictability and certainty. It is a positive approach that would look to
factual and measurable indicia of privacy. Either one has or does not have privacy protection
based on their level of control over the information. There may be some technology for which
people have no actual expectation of privacy and, therefore, would not qualify for section 8
protection. Law enforcement would not require any judicial authority to search those things.
The biographical core and the totality of the circumstances could easily be used under a
risk analysis approach to section 8. Both analytical tools are positive and factually driven. Details
of financial or medical history would be objectively protected as falling within a biographical core,
so long as the person did not expose that information to a risk of disclosure to the State. Similarly,
ownership, possession and control could inform the totality of the circumstances in an objective
sense to assess whether the person put their information at risk. The fact that these analytical tools
fit so well within a risk analysis approach should be concerning when they are employed in a
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normative framework. The confusion in the application of the biographical core as a tool of
analysis and the place of criminality would still need to be addressed. Precise and exact language
is critical since part of the problem is the language used by the Court. A clear definition of what
the SCC means by the term “biographical core” would be necessary. I would suggest a return to
the first framing of the biographical core in Plant. The SCC in Plant defined the biographical core
as including “information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal
choices of the individual.” With that starting point, I would add more definition to that language.
Under the risk analysis approach, a biographical core should only include intimate details and
personal choices that are actually held in confidence. If individuals do not realistically protect
their information, it should not be considered part of a protected biographical core.
The risk analysis has been strongly rejected by the SCC on more than one occasion,429
primary because privacy would be inadequately protected under that approach. 430 Advanced
technology is cited as a concern under the risk analysis, since the State may soon be able to record
a limitless amount of information about civilians unless people start becoming hermits.431 The
fears of big brother and an always watching state would be realized under a risk analysis approach
to section 8. With the growth of technology, there would be a diminished actual expectation of
privacy in our information and a restriction of section 8’s protection.
Let’s assume we are working under the proposed option – risk analysis – in the context of
an Alexa search. Reviewing the material from chapter 2 will assist with this determination. Alexa
is really a tool of the advertising and commercial industries to effectively direct market products
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to its users. When the voice commands are captured, they are held by Alexa and used by a
corporation. The reality of data breaches and security failures would put an Alexa user’s data at
risk. When one uses such interactive technology, they assume a risk that their information will be
recorded and disseminated in a way that is outside of their control. Given the risk that their
information could be obtained by the State, it would not attract privacy protection under section 8.
A look at previously decided judgments perhaps better shows the potential impact of this
option. In Spencer, the SCC was dealing with a case involving one’s IP address, as has been
explained in detail in chapter 4.432 The Court held that Spencer had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information and that the police were not authorized by law to obtain the subscriber
information matching the IP address from the ISP, Shaw communications. If we use a risk
analysis, the outcome would likely change. It would be easier to conclude that Spencer had no
realistic expectation of privacy in the information gathered from Shaw, being the assigned IP
address which led to his geographic location. I say this because Spencer was on a computer in a
home that was not owned by him, he was connected to the world wide web in a file sharing, open
forum with hundreds, if not thousands, of users who could observe his activity. The IP address,
held by an ISP, is shared and known by every website he visited.
Spencer, under a risk analysis approach, would be more closely aligned with the American
approach. In United States v Michaud, a US District Court dealt with a situation almost identical
to Spencer’s except that the website was accessed through the TOR network.433 Jay Michaud lived
in Vancouver, Washington and was charged with receipt and possession of child pornography. He
applied to have the evidence excluded but the court found he had no reasonable expectation of
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privacy in his IP address. The Supreme Court of the United States has developed the third-party
doctrine which holds that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties” which means the government can obtain information from
a third party without a warrant.434 Courts in the US have held that “an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her IP address, thereby eliminating the need for a warrant”.435 In
the US “[e]very federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to
an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation”.436 That
third party approach in Canada would mean that Spencer did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, there was no search and, therefore, no Charter violation.
Marakah is another case where the determination may have changed had it been based on
the risk analysis. The actual privacy we have in our sent text messages is hardly considered secure
after we hit send. Chief Justice McLachlin for the majority held that Marakah did not lose control
of the electronic conversation simply because another possessed it or could access it.437 Yet,
anyone who sends a message through text actually loses control over the conversation (who can
see it, have access to it), unless the maintain control over both the sending and receiving device
through a RAT or possession.438 Once he sent the text message to his accomplice’s phone, he took
the risk that text message conversation would be disclosed to the State. Justice Moldaver’s dissent

434

“The Digital Underworld”, at 111.
“The Digital Underworld”, at 116; United States v Ferrell, 2016 WL 705197 (2016), at 1; United States v Matish,
193 F Supp 3d 585, 2016 WL 3545776 (2017), at 20-21; United States v Werdene, 188 F Supp 3d 431, 2016 WL
3002376 (2016); Michaud, at para 7.
436
United States v Perrine, 518 F3d 1196 (10th Cir 2008); See also: United States v Bynum, 604 F3d 161 (4th Cir
2010); and United States v Stults, 575 F3d 834 (8th Cir 2009).
437
Marakah, para 41.
438
Possession could be physical possession of the device, joint possession with another person or constructive
possession through means such as intimidation or threat. In each of these cases, the person would exert control over
the electronic conversation to maintain privacy protection.
435

105

in Marakah aligns with this approach to restrict section 8 to realistic expectations of privacy. As
he expressed within his dissenting judgment:
Here, Mr. Marakah had no control whatsoever over the text message conversations
on Mr. Winchester’s phone. Mr. Winchester had complete autonomy over those
conversations. He was free to disclose them to anyone he wished, at any time, and
for any purpose. To say that Mr. Marakah had a reasonable expectation of personal
privacy in the text message conversations despite his total lack of control over them
severs the interconnected relationship between privacy and control that has long
formed part of our s. 8 jurisprudence. It is equally at odds with the fundamental
principle that individuals can and will share information as they see fit in a free and
democratic society.439 [emphasis added]
Had this been the majority judgment, the expectation of privacy analysis would more closely fit
the risk analysis approach. These case examples, of Spencer and Marakah are used here only to
illustrate the point that the SCC would likely come to different conclusions if the risk analysis
were the approach applied to section 8 cases.
Adopting the risk analysis would affect how the Mills case is decided.

Through

communicating on Facebook with a minor, Mills took the risk that the child would betray the
confidence. He did not know who was on the other end of the communications. The fact that it
was a police officer who was able to testify as to the exchange was a risk he took by engaging in
the child luring on the internet.
This risk analysis option would likely be rejected by the SCC without too much
consideration because it does not fit well with Canadian values. As Justice Côté put it: “Canadians
are not required to become digital recluses in order to maintain some semblance of privacy in their
lives.”440 The adamant rejection of the risk analysis would likely continue.
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5.4 A SPECTRUM OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
In this section outline a third option for the Court to consider – a spectrum of privacy
protection for section 8 cases dealing specifically with technology. This proposal is most closely
aligned with and builds upon current jurisprudence – different levels of justification and procedural
requirements based on the level of privacy implicated. Parliament has recognized, and the
legislation reflects, varying degrees of prerequisites for different types of searches based on the
type of information collected. Who can authorize and apply for certain search warrants and what
offences qualify varies according to the type of search involved. For example, a search warrant
pursuant to section 487 of the Criminal Code provides that a “justice”441 may issue a search warrant
but an interception for private communications requires a judge442 of the superior court of the
province, unless there is a consent to the interception.443 Certain warrants require that the
authorization be applied for by the Attorney General instead of simply a peace officer. 444 The
Criminal Code outlines the legal thresholds that law enforcement must establish for obtaining
interception of private communications, search warrants, general warrants and production orders.
The legal standard for each of these authorizations ranges from “reasonable grounds to believe”445
to “reasonable grounds to suspect”.446 After certain warrant-specific preconditions have been met,
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police may conduct a search of a specified place in relation to a specified offence. As the degree
of intrusiveness increases so too do the conditions attached to obtaining the warrant. For example,
in order to obtain an authorization to intercept private communications, one of the more intrusive
search tools available to law enforcement, the application must demonstrate investigative
necessity.447 There are recognized exceptions to the requirements of prior judicial authorization
such as customs border searches, search incidental to arrest, circumstances of urgency and dog
sniffer searches.448 In this way, the law already recognizes a continuum of constitutionally valid
standards for privacy protection.449 The difference with this option is that the spectrum I propose
is explicitly and specifically meant to address informational privacy in emerging technologies.
There are infinite shades of gray regarding online privacy. 450 A spectrum of privacy
protection would match this reality. As Justice Binnie noted in M(A), all searches “do not have
the same invasive and disruptive quality”.451 This continuum of lawful standards could allow for
searches of technology to be clearly and predictably reasonable, without prior judicial
authorization in some circumstances. Looking at the “intermediate standard” in M(A) for sniffer
dog searches is helpful for creating a new standard for emerging technology. In that case, the SCC
found that because the search was minimally intrusive, specific in nature and had pinpoint
accuracy, a new threshold was needed. The related case of Kang-Brown explained that the lower
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standard was “pragmatic and balanced”452 for sniffer dog searches partly because it was minimally
intrusive – the dog did not touch the person, the dog’s indication was subdued, the search did not
require a significant amount of time or undue inconvenience and did not interfere with bodily
integrity.453 In addition, the SCC considered the specific nature of the search – the only personal
information revealed by the search is the presence or absence of drugs. The last consideration was
the pinpoint accuracy of the search.454
If one transposes these three considerations into the technology context, it becomes clear
that much technology would meet the criteria of being minimally intrusive, specific and having
pinpoint accuracy. Minimal intrusion occurs when police search technology. In many instances,
the person does not even know a search occurred, there is no inconvenience and it does not interfere
with bodily integrity. Even though technology searches can engage significant information
privacy interests, not every search will be a significant intrusion.455 Certainly the level of intrusion
would depend on the technology at issue. The data collected from a wired coffee pot, fridge or
other home appliance would likely not rise to the level of being considered a significant intrusion.
As to the specific nature of the search, technological searches can be restricted to only obtain the
precise information sought. Lastly, with respect to pinpoint accuracy, with a narrow target and
precise search, technology is more accurate than the best sniffer. One should ask if the SCC’s
intermediate standard is appropriate for certain technology searches. Because of the SCC’s
continued recognition of a heightened expectation of privacy in computers and cell phones, it is
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not likely this particular technology that would fit the new standard. However, the IoTs has yet to
be adjudicated by the SCC and leaves room for such consideration.
Where should the IoTs technology fall on a privacy continuum compared to a dog sniff?
While sniffer dogs are “incredibly powerful and reliable tools,” so too is technology.456 Allowing
for a continuum of protection recognizes that different technological devices may, in fact, fall at
different places on that spectrum. Application of this idea to the IoTs requires answering when an
authorization is required, who can apply for it and grant it and what, if any, conditions there would
be to such authorization. Because not all technology is the same, the answer cannot be uniform
for all devices. The use of categories will illustrate how this approach could be applied.
5.4.1 Category #1 – “Smart” Technology that is “Dumb”
Some of our “smart” technologies are relatively “dumb” in the sense that while they are
embedded in household goods and connected to the internet or other devices, they cannot listen or
respond to their owner. Such devices would include the smart fridge that knows every time the
door has opened and stores the time in a database, or the light bulb that detects particular
movement. These devices transmit a message wirelessly to a server whenever there is activity.457
This digital information does not reveal a massive amount of information about the device’s user
but the specific data it does reveal may be useful to police. For example, if police are trying to
find out if someone who lives in a rural area is home at a particular time, the information about
their fridge and light bulbs would help. They cannot drive right up to the home to look for
themselves so if the data tells them that the fridge door was opened 5 minutes ago, and the lights
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are on, they can assume someone is home. This is just an assumption based on data, but it is better
than a blind assumption.
Any search to obtain data from a dumb device would be minimally intrusive, specific and
have pinpoint accuracy.458 It is minimally intrusive because the search does not require law
enforcement to enter the home, does not touch the person or require them to do anything, causes
no inconvenience nor interfere with the subject’s bodily integrity. It is specific in nature. The
only information revealed by the search is data about that particular device. The search is very
restricted because no other information would be obtained. The results of the search would be a
list of dates and times indicating on or off for the light bulb. Lastly, the search would have pinpoint
accuracy. The data is precise and more accurate than any human observation. While the device
is in someone’s private residence, the search actually takes place at the location of the server where
the data is stored.
In addition to the three considerations outlined above and adapted from the sniffer dog
cases, in this continuum for technology it is important to have one additional consideration – the
type of detail involved in the search. For Category #1 devices, I suggest that the information
obtained is mundane. On its own it does not tell much about a person. I would imagine that the
SCC would treat this type of technology must like they did the FLIR or DRA. Like FLIR, the
information “may or may not be capable of giving rise to an inference about what was actually
going on inside”459 And similar to DRA, the information disclosed is not of an intimate or private
nature, not confidential like a doctor-patient relationship nor does it disclose political affiliation,
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sexual orientation, etc. of the user.460 These devices in Category #1 provide a pattern of use of a
device.
A discussion of this category would not be complete without addressing Chief Justice
McLachlin’s concerns raised in Gomboc. In that case, she expressed a concern about DRA
technology as follows:
Our consent to these “intrusions” into our privacy, and into our homes, is both
necessary and conditional: necessary, because we would otherwise deprive
ourselves of services nowadays considered essential; and conditional, because we
permit access to our private information for the sole, specific, and limited purpose
of receiving those services.461
The difference with “smart” devices is that they are totally optional, unlike electricity use in the
case of DRA data. Smart devices are not “essential” to our lives. They are likely nice to have as
a luxury but certainly not required in order to live a fulsome existence. Not having the newest
technology embedded in our homes is currently not unusual. That may, of course, change in the
next decade but for now Chief Justice McLachlin’s concerns do not apply to the dumb devices in
Category #1.
Now that I have outlined what Category #1 would look like, it is essential to outline any
prerequisites for searches of these devices. For this category of technology, I suggest that police
be permitted to search Category #1 devices on a reasonable suspicion standard without requiring
judicial preauthorization. Justice Binnie succinctly explained the reasonable suspicion standard
in Kang-Brown:
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is not a new juridical standard called into
existence for the purposes of this case. "Suspicion" is an expectation that the
460
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targeted individual is possibly engaged in some criminal activity. A "reasonable"
suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion and something less than a
belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.462
A reasonable suspicion is not speculation but rather is objectively verifiable evidence that a crime
will be or has been committed. Where a reasonable suspicion exists, a search of Category #1
devices would be authorized by the common law as it was in Kang-Brown,463 given the minimally
intrusive nature of the search, specific target and pinpoint accuracy of the search through
technology. A search would still fail to be reasonable if there is an absence of reasonable suspicion
or if the search is not conducted reasonably. These safeguards of the reasonable suspicion standard
and a reasonable search prevent police from randomly spying on people or spying based on a
hunch.
While there are judicial pre-authorizations on a suspicion standard within the Criminal
Code for certain production orders464, I propose that no judicial authorization would be required
for Category #1 for efficiency and practical reasons. Police will likely want to engage Category
#1 devices frequently. The implications of requiring already overburdened courts to deal with
applications for searches of Category #1 devices are obvious – investigative delays and more
paperwork for judges. Realistically, if police are contemplating searching a Category #1 device,
they will also likely be seeking to search devices under Category #2 and/or Category #3, which do
require judicial authorization. I would not want to add more responsibility to the courts when this
category engages such relatively minor privacy interests.
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5.4.2 Category #2 – Technology that Potentially Reveals Sensitive Information
I propose that the devices in this category are more than sensors and are capable of
ascertaining sensitive information about the user’s lifestyle. These would include devices such as
a smart watch, Fitbit, or other wearable technology and devices that capture personal information.
While wearable technology likely all have GPS capability and can therefore be used for tracking
a person, I am only concerned with the search of all data from these devices, not just the tracking
function specifically.465 Smart watch devices and smart beds record and store information about
the user’s heart rate and sleep patterns.466 This medical-like information is higher on the spectrum
of privacy than whether a light bulb is on or off.
Searches of the devices in this category are still minimally intrusive, specific in nature and
have pinpoint accuracy. Similar to Category #1, law enforcement does not enter the home, touch
the person or require them to do anything, cause inconvenience or interfere with bodily integrity.
Again, the information revealed by the search is the specific data about the device and it is exact.
However, the difference comes with the added consideration of the type of detail discovered. For
Category #2 devices, the information cannot be described as mundane because it can reveal a
pattern of use of an individual user and details about their lifestyle. While the biographical core
analysis could be used here, it is not necessary to understand the point that this technology, in
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Category #2 provides the type of detail deserving of some protection higher on the spectrum than
those in Category #1.
For law enforcement to legally search the devices in Category #2, I suggest that police
proceed on a reasonable grounds standard and seek judicial pre-authorization. This standard is the
one for tracking devices for tracking an individual’s movements within the Criminal Code467 and
makes sense as we move to more sensitive information. Police would be required to demonstrate
on oath reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been or will be committed to the
satisfaction of a judicial officer. I propose, similar to the tracking warrant provision that either a
justice or a judge can be the recipient of such applications.468
5.4.3 Category #3 – Smart Technology that is (Too) Smart
The devices in Category #3 are truly smart devices. They are devices that we interact with,
either through voice commands or programming. These devices can listen and respond to us.
Smart televisions with cameras, microphones and speakers and digital assistants such as Alexa
would be included in this category. I say these devices are too smart because they have the ability
to surreptitiously listen to our daily ramblings and record massive amounts of information about
us that we likely would not want shared with anyone. Searches of these devices indisputably and
effectively amount to an invasion of privacy and the protections outlined within Part VI of the
Criminal Code should be the starting point for any search or seizure. Before police are granted
access to the data (including voice communications) of such devices, they would need reasonable
and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been or will be committed. As for what
467
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offences would qualify, the list of offences provided in section 183 of the Criminal Code would
seem to make a good starting reference point. The other safeguards set out in Part VI of the
Criminal Code – limited period of authorization and investigative necessity would be equally
applicable. Additional requirements for Category #3 devices should also be considered since the
information gathered is actually more than just what was said in an intercepted conversation; it
includes data such as where the person was when they were talking, how long they were speaking,
who they were talking to, that other person’s contact information, the history of their
communications, etc. Protections may include mandatory live monitoring, but the judge should
be given wide latitude to set out appropriate terms and conditions to the order. If you consider an
Alexa’s ability to record data, this device is a room probe, video camera and audio recording
device. As with Part VI authorizations, only judges of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction
should be permitted to authorize such searches given the serious intrusion on privacy.
The ideal solution for voice command devices would be for the definition of private
communications within the Criminal Code to be expanded to include conversations with devices.
Considering the future of technology includes increasingly common Artificial Intelligence
devices, this solution would have wide reaching application. The current definition of “private
communication” reads:
any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator
who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is
in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the
originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the
person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based
telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose
of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by
the originator to receive it.469
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Parliament could amend the definition simply as follows:
any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator
who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is
in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the
originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the
person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based
telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose
of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by
the originator to receive it.
In the meantime, the SCC can interpret communications with devices as substantively equivalent
to private communications. This would be similar to what Justice Moldaver did in Telus when he
found that the investigative technique was substantively equivalent to an intercept, as defined in
the Criminal Code.470
As Justice Binnie noted in Tessling, the reasonableness of the search has to be determined
by looking at current, not potential future, of technology capabilities.471 A device may transition
from Category #1 to Category #2 or even #3. It is not hard to image a fridge soon having a
microphone and speaker to accept voice commands. While this creates some uncertainty, knowing
each of the categories and what the consequences will be does provide some level of predictability;
certainly, more than simply saying any evolution in the future will be dealt with by the courts on
a step by step basis as was done in Tessling.472 While I suggest three categories I am sure that the
IoTs could make up 10 or more categories. However, the usefulness of more categories did not
seem to be useful given the three search thresholds: reasonable suspicion, reasonable belief or
reasonable belief plus.
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This spectrum approach acknowledges that not all technology is the same and does not
present the same information nor should it attract the same privacy protection; one cannot use same
analysis for a fridge as for Alexa. Given the breadth of gadgets that make up the IoTs, some
searches would be minimally intrusive while others would not. This spectrum approach also
allows courts to recognize a heightened, reduced or non-existent privacy interest where
appropriate.
5.4.4 A Hypothetical Scenario – Mr. Criminal and his Technology
A hypothetical scenario will demonstrate the likely consequences of this proposed
spectrum. Mr. Criminal is running a drug trafficking operation from his increasingly common and
typical smart home. He owns a smart television that has voice control 473 and a smart fridge.474
For Christmas last year his parents bought him a Fitbit and an Alexa, both of which he uses every
day. Mr. Criminal is a typical Canadian, having a Facebook profile where he shares photos of
himself and his family at BBQs and hanging out at home. He communicates with his underlings
via text message from his smart phone; telling them when and where to pick up and deliver the
drugs.
Police have suspected Mr. Criminal of being involved in drug trafficking. Their suspicions
are based on intelligence gathered through multiple credible informants who tell them that Mr.
Criminal brings large shipments of cocaine, heroin and Fentanyl into Canada and uses a local
network of drug dealers to distribute the drugs throughout the Maritimes. They are also told that
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Mr. Criminal is single and lives alone. Police use open source internet searches to canvass Mr.
Criminal’s social media activity hoping to gather information about his activities as part of their
preliminary investigation. No search warrant is needed for gathering this information since it is
an open source search, open to everyone on the internet. Mr. Criminal must not have set his
privacy settings on his Facebook profile set to “private” because police easily find lots photographs
of Mr. Criminal. In some photographs he is out with his friends at local pubs and restaurants.
Police can identify those individuals from their experience as known and convicted street level
drug dealers. There are also photographs of Mr. Criminal around his home during what appears
to a family BBQ. Police use this information to corroborate the details provided by the informants.
Police can see the smart television and fridge along with an Alexa machine in the background.
Comments on his social media pages also give insight. For example, Mr. Criminal’s product
review of Alexa confirms he owns that product. His “like” of a Fitbit and related comments also
tell other users that he has one, uses it and likes it. Mr. Criminal has an open dating profile where
he says he is single and lives alone. Mr. Criminal does not appear to ever attend employment or
comment on work in his social media accounts, yet he boasts about having a new home and driving
a jaguar.
With the above information from confidential informants being credible, corroborated and
current, police have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Criminal is committing the crime of
drug trafficking pursuant to section 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.475 At this point,
they could search devices within Category #1 without a judicial authorization. They decide to
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search Mr. Criminal’s smart fridge by accessing its data to find out the pattern of his activity. They
discover that last week he opened the fridge door as follows:
Monday – 3:34am, 3:40am, 9:38am, 2:52pm, 6:03pm, 9:20pm and 10:59pm
Tuesday – 3:30am, 3:37am, 9:35am, 3:05pm, 6:10pm, 9:00pm and 10:45pm
Wednesday – 3:36am, 3:44am, 9:40am, 4:00pm, 6:15pm, 9:12pm and 11:02pm
Thursday – 3:34am, 3:40am, 9:38am, 1:52pm, 6:03pm, 9:20pm and 10:59pm
Friday – 3:32am, 3:38am, 9:42am, 2:58pm, 6:03pm, 9:03pm and 11:10pm
Based on the above data, police discovered that Mr. Criminal is awake every weekday around
3:30am. He then appears to be active again by 9:30am. He is home during the day because he
opens the fridge door again in the afternoons between 2 and 3pm and in the evening around 9pm.
The last time the door is opened every day is 11:10pm indicating he is likely home for the evening.
This data leads to an assumption that Mr. Criminal does not work a 9am to 5pm job, since he is
home throughout the hours of the day. The activity around 3:30am is somewhat suspicious, but
not determinative, and so police decide to focus their energies on the target at that time, thinking
perhaps that is when he is conducting illegal activity.
After conducting significant physical surveillance of Mr. Criminal in the early morning
hours, police discover Mr. Criminal regularly leaves his residence between 3:45am and 4am to
meet with individuals who are known to be involved in the drug trade at an abandoned parking lot.
Over the course of several months, police continue their surveillance and discover a pattern of
meetings. They decide to conduct traffic stops on vehicles of Mr. Criminal’s associates after the
two have met. On two occasions they discovered kilograms of cocaine in the vehicles of the
associates.
The police decide that they want to purse an investigation into Mr. Criminal. The next
investigative steps would involve gathering more digital data. They want to use his Fitbit as a
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tracking device, so they can follow him with physical surveillance without getting too close. There
are provisions in the Criminal Code that allow police to apply to a justice or judge for tracking the
location of an individual through a device, which includes a computer program.476 They must have
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been or will be committed. In this fact scenario,
the police can use Mr. Criminal’s Fitbit program to track him. In addition to tracking him, police
want to access the other data available through Mr. Criminal’s Fitbit to glean information about
his sleep patterns and heart rate. This information would provide insight into what he is doing
when he is home during the day, i.e. if he sleeps all afternoon this adds to the police theory that he
is living off the proceeds of crime instead of working from home. The search for this data still
falls within the Category #2 class of devices and would require judicial authorization based on
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been or will be committed. In
addition, police will have to expressly demonstrate what they are looking for in the data and how
that will aid in moving their investigation forward.
The results of the search warrant for Mr. Criminal’s Fitbit shows that he does in fact sleep
most days between 11:00pm and 3:30am and again between 10:00am and 2:00pm. The police are
still not able to get close enough to Mr. Criminal or any of his associates to know the details of the
drug shipments or where the drugs are coming from. The police want to know who he talks to on
a regular basis and confirm whether in fact Mr. Criminal is a high-level drug dealer. They want
to learn where he gets the drugs from and to whom he sells them, so they can capture the entire
drug ring for prosecution. The police decide they have a plan to gather all that information. They
want to obtain access to Mr. Criminal’s devices – the smart television and Alexa in his residence.
They think if they hack into the technology and activate the microphones, they can listen in on
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everything he says. That would clearly be a private communication within the definition of the
Criminal Code and an authorization would be needed.477 Any search conducted of the smart
television with audio and video recording abilities or Alexa device would require the Category #3
approach. The police will be required to apply to a judge of the superior court for an authorization.
Their application must outline their reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a specified
offence has been or will be committed, the time period they seek the interception and how it is
necessary to the investigation.
Under this proposed option, the Court would be able to eliminate the confusion surrounding
the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy since there would be no need to consider it.
This option – a spectrum of privacy protection – provides the concrete benefits of certainty and
predictability that are the cornerstone of section 8. This option is less normative and more positive
in its approach but achieves the purpose of section 8 in a practical way. The categories within this
spectrum are able to expand as required by technologies that do not yet even exist. Under this
approach, the balance between individual privacy and law enforcement would be clearly
understood such that judicial actors could be engaged when required by the privacy interest at
issue.

5.5 MOVE SECTION 8 BEYOND PRIVACY
Perhaps we have reached full circle. We are back to the comments of Justice Dickson in
Hunter v Southam when he said:
Like the Supreme Court of the United States, I would be wary of foreclosing the
possibility that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure might
477
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protect interests beyond the right of privacy, but for purposes of the present appeal
I am satisfied that its protections go at least that far.478
Justice Dickson did not need to consider section 8 beyond privacy in Hunter v Southam because it
was not necessary for that case. The pervasiveness of technology demands that we consider this
option for section 8, beyond the right of individual privacy. What would a future with search and
seizure protection beyond privacy look like? How can the line be drawn between lawful and
unlawful searches of technology in the context of criminal investigations? Move beyond simply
privacy. This can be done through 1) a collective understanding of privacy and 2) appreciating a
broader understanding of section 8 to address the genuine underlying concern of dignity.
5.5.1 Section 8 as a Collective Right
As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3, the SCC has framed section 8 privacy protection as
an individual right. With that premise, the implication of a Charter violation under section 8
currently can result in an exclusion of evidence from the trial of an accused pursuant to section
24(2) of the Charter.

That is an individual specific result. But we are living in a culture with

pervasive technology and little actual control over our data. Because technology has connected
our devices and ourselves to many other individuals and corporations, breaches of privacy now
have a ripple effect on a multiplicity of people. Section 8, viewed as a collective right, recognizes
and acknowledges the connectivity of society through technology as discussed in detail in chapter
2. As Justice LaForest noted in Edwards back in 1996, section 8 should not be limited as an
individual right but rather can be viewed as a collective value recognizing with our shared values
of sociality, connectiveness and openness. This assertion of a collective right is explicit in the
Charter’s recognition that “everyone” is protected from unreasonable searches or seizures.
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When one person’s section 8 rights are breached, the impact could be wider ranging than
simply an exclusion of evidence for that particular accused person. For example, the Court could
extend any exclusion of evidence to related trials or provide stays of proceeding pursuant to
sections 8 and 24(1) of the Charter. They have this ability currently through Section 7 together
with section 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence or order a stay of proceedings as a matter of
trial fairness.479 However, on a collective understanding of section 8 the Court would not need to
resort to the residual protection of section 7. If evidence was obtained by an unconstitutional
search or seizure, such that it was excluded for the accomplice, it would not be fair to be able to
use the text messages against the other party to the conversation. The Court can appreciate that in
today’s technology world, we are connected to a larger degree than ever before and our rights are
not as exclusive as they once were.
This approach is within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and strengthens the Court’s
protection of privacy in our digital age. Currently the section 8 analysis is to balance competing
values; individual interests and rights against our collective preference and desire for security. It
seems a fairer contest would be if the balancing were instead a collective right against collective
security. Perhaps then the scales would balance differently.
5.5.2 Dignity as a Primary Concern
The place of dignity within current section 8 jurisprudence was detailed in chapter 4,
section 4.2.3. There I argued that the core concern underlying all search and seizures cases is
really dignity. The goal of section 8 of the Charter is to prevent searches and seizures that present
an affront to human dignity. That is what search and seizure does, it intrudes on our dignity. If

479

R v Jewitt, [1985] 2 SCR 128, 21 CCC (3d) 7. See also Marakah, para 192.
124

the State does not have proper lawful authorization, that search is unreasonable and therefore
unlawful.
Without more, using the concept of dignity brings no more clarity to section 8
jurisprudence. The Court must explain what they mean by dignity in the section 8 context and
explain how a framework of dignity will protect against Charter violations. This can be done by
drawing on the Court’s wealth of jurisprudence in other Charter cases. As Justice Wilson
commented, the “Charter and the right to individual liberty guaranteed under it are inextricably
tied to the concept of human dignity”.480 Dignity is an underlying value that “finds expression in
almost every right and freedom guaranteed in the Charter”.481 This idea is also found in Chief
Justice Dickson’s (as he then was), discussion of Charter interpretation in R v Oakes,
A second contextual element of interpretation of s. 1 is provided by the words "free
and democratic society". Inclusion of these words as the final standard of
justification for limits on rights and freedoms refers the Court to the very purpose
for which the Charter was originally entrenched in the Constitution: Canadian
society is to be free and democratic. The Court must be guided by the values and
principles essential to a free and democratic society which I believe embody, to
name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect
for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying
values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and
demonstrably justified.482
Section 7 of the Charter can inform section 8 jurisprudence.483 In the per curiam judgment
of Carter v Canada, the SCC struck down the Criminal Code prohibition of assisted suicide
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pursuant to section 7 of the Charter’s protection of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person.484 In that judgement, the Court had to balance the competing values of dignity and the
sanctity of life, showing it is possible to discuss and approach a Charter protection using the
dignity standard. In Reference re s. 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), Justice Lamer
explained that the principles of fundamental justice contained within section 7 of the Charter are
derived from the “essential elements of a system for the administration of justice which is founded
upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person”.485
In addition to holding significance in our domestic laws, dignity is intimately linked to
human rights in international law.486 For example, the United Nations Charter sets out that each
state must “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person”.487 In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations General Assembly
pronounced that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 488 The
preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provides that the States
which have ratified the Covenant shall recognize “the inherent dignity and … inalienable rights of
all members of the human family” and that this recognition is “the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world”.489 It also states that human rights derive from “the inherent dignity of the
human person”.490
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While dignity is a central tenant of our system of laws, it is a subjective idea. It fits well
with the normative approach to section 8 in answering what protection we should expect from
searches and seizures. Dignity is not measured positively through an assessment of the physical
parameters of the search, i.e. if a search touches a person below their waistline or discloses medical
information, it then infringes on their dignity. Dignity can instead be considered the permeating
factor in deciding section 8 Charter claims and a central piece of the analysis, taking into account
the specific context of technology in our society. Everyone has a right to dignity and it should not
be infringed unreasonably. This clarity in purpose makes the analysis easier to implement; dignity
would be given the utmost respect during police investigations, searches and seizures. The line
between lawful and unlawful searches of technology would be when the search invades on the
dignity of the person.
With the IoTs, we release information without retaining control over future dissemination
of that information. We have little control over any information in our technology; it is both
intentionally and unknowingly shared with corporations and the public. If the SCC recognizes
section 8 protection beyond privacy, control can be eliminated as a consideration. Looking to the
most recent authority from the SCC on section 8 in a technology case, Marakah, we see that the
majority minimized the role of control in holding it was not dispositive and only one factor to be
considered in the totality of the circumstances.491 For this option of moving beyond privacy for
section 8 protection, Chief Justice McLachlin’s position for the majority in Marakah is a step in
the right direction. The ideal analysis under this option would not place any weight on control as
a factor or consideration because the reality is that we have very little control over our digital data.
To maintain control as relevant, even as just one factor, does not appreciate the technological
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reality. Additionally, our future is likely to be a world where our actual control over our digital
data will be even further diminished as corporations strive to gain more consumer data for direct
marketing and customer acquisition.
With the current tools of analysis for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy
removed from the equation (because privacy would not be the threshold consideration), many of
the problems identified in chapter 4 would be eliminated. We would not have to resort to the
biographical core to establish a sphere of information that deserves protection. The confusion
surrounding the biographical core, what it entails and its usefulness in section 8 cases would no
longer be relevant since the real issue would be a concern for the larger values protected by a
revived section 8. The factors that make up the “totality of the circumstances” test would likely
be relevant but not be as significant because the values at play, more than the search itself, would
be central to the inquiry. While a new framework cannot stop the Court from leaving caveats and
providing split decisions, it would remove the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and the
problems associated with it. When legislation is not adequately addressing a search or seizure
issue, the expanded scope of section 8 to protect dignity could still provide protection of the
interests at stake.
New problems may, and likely will develop but, at least, our Charter protections would
not be restricted to constraints of privacy considerations. Until something is done to change our
section 8 analysis, we will be left with unpredictability in how the SCC responds to search cases
and how law enforcement should engage in investigations that intersect with technology. We
should aim to go back to the basics of section 8 – prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
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5.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter outlined four options for the SCC to consider to better address searches of
technology within section 8 of the Charter. Although there are likely a variety of potential other
options for the Court moving forward, I believe that the four outlined above are the most realistic
and achievable. The first option was to effectively do nothing and maintain the status quo. This
option was quickly rejected because without any changes, the challenges identified in chapter 4 –
incompetent analytical tools and uncertainty – will continue.
The section option was to embrace the risk analysis approach to privacy cases. This option
will likely be considered the most controversial and undesirable, which is not surprising given the
Court’s constant rejection of the risk analysis and our society’s general regard for privacy
protection. This option was rejected because of the obvious contradiction with the high value
placed on privacy by Canadians.
I suggested a spectrum of privacy protection as the third option for the Court to consider.
The proposed three categories for technology were based upon intrusiveness, specificity, accuracy
and the type of detail involved in the search. As the technology engaged becomes smarter and the
detail more enlightening, the procedural requirements become more rigorous. A hypothetical
scenario involving Mr. Criminal was used to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed categories.
I believe that these categories would be advantageous for the Court when addressing emerging
technologies, primarily because of the predictability it creates. I believe this is the most viable
option of the Court moving forward within current section 8 jurisprudence. It requires some
adaptation but no drastic changes to our understanding of the law of search and seizure.
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The last option I outlined would see the most dramatic change made to section 8. Moving
section 8 past the idea of individual privacy interests and toward a collective understanding of
privacy based on dignity complements our ideals of privacy and our cultural respect for it. Section
8 is normatively orientated towards a fundamental respect for human dignity, making any
transition to this option an easy one. The Court could draw upon its own references to dignity
within past section 8 cases and its other Charter jurisprudence. This option is the best one for
section 8 jurisprudence because it best fits our understanding of privacy and has the flexibility
required to address the challenges the Court will inevitability face with emerging technologies
involved in criminal investigations. However, more research would be required to adequately
address the questions that naturally arise from the ideas expressed in this alternative proposal.
Some of those questions include: How can an understanding of section 8 as a collective right help
bring clarity and predictability to searches and seizures of technology?

How would this

understanding interact with the idea of dignity that underlies section 8 jurisprudence? How can
the Court create normative yet concrete tools to judge when dignity is affected by a search and/or
seizure? What would this look like in the reality of law enforcement efforts? Answering these
questions is essential to developing this option for the Court and could certainly form the basis of
another research project. The first step towards change is recognizing the possibility of viewing
section 8 as a collective right and acknowledging the central place of dignity in any section 8
analysis.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In early 2018, Chief Justice McLachlin responded to a question about privacy law at
Dalhousie’s Schulich School of Law by saying, “privacy, what privacy?”492 She expressed her
opinion that in our current age, there are huge threats to our privacy; people are less aware and
have no control over where their information goes.
Technology has developed at a rapid pace within the last fifty years. It has become
pervasive and almost inescapable. In 2014, Justice Karakatsanis in the dissenting judgement of
Fearon, expressed that we “live in a time of profound technological change and innovation” and
that technological developments “have revolutionized our daily lives”.493 We live in a society
where mass data collection is a reality and its insecurity is alarming. Our culture has accepted
surveillance, social media and the IoTs with open arms. When we embrace the IoTs, we invite
technology to record our movements, daily activities, habits, and we ask it to predict when we need
to change a light bulb or drink more water. We are handing over enormous amounts of information
about ourselves to corporations and lose exclusive control over it. We realistically live in a world
with very little privacy any longer; or at least significant practical challenges to privacy. The more
technology becomes embedded in our lives, the smaller our sphere of real privacy becomes.
Technology impacts criminal investigations; it has become a tool for committing crime and a tool
for investigating crime. The aim of this thesis was to bring legal certainty to the use of technology
in criminal investigations to answer the question: how can the line be drawn between lawful and
unlawful searches?
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Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads: “Everyone has the right
to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”494 Privacy is the central idea for determining
when a search or seizure is unreasonable. Searches or seizures will violate section 8 of the Charter
when they invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court has advocated for a normative
and neutral approach that balances individual privacy with the interests of law enforcement. To
do that they have created two primary tools of analysis – the biographical core and the totality of
the circumstances. The SCC has held that section 8 should protect a biographical core of
information that includes information that tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and
personal choices of an individual. However, this idea has seemingly lost prominence within the
Court’s jurisprudence and it is unclear what is included within the core. The totality of the
circumstances test is meant to ensure that the context of a search is taken into consideration. Its
current formulation includes four factors for consideration: the subject matter of the search,
whether the claimant had a direct interest in the subject matter, whether the claimant had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter and whether that expectation was
objectively reasonable. The considerations under the totality of the circumstances test are heavily
weighted toward the chosen definition of the subject matter which makes this test difficult to
predict. The factors under the test are positive which creates a disconnect with the Court’s stated
intention of employing a normative analysis.
In addition to the challenges identified with the tools of analysis, chapter 4 highlights the
problem with uncertainty prevalent in the current jurisprudence. The uncertainty is created by the
Court’s case-by-case approach to technology cases and compounded by their willingness to leave
caveats and provide split decisions. Out of date legislation contributes to the problem even further
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when it comes to technology that the law did not anticipate. As chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, the
current law on section 8 is problematic. The Mills case was used as an example to demonstrate
how the challenges with section 8 jurisprudence are affecting real investigations and prosecutions.
As the SCC has stated, the rights enshrined in section 8 “must remain aligned with
technological developments”.495 To remain aligned, the Court must appreciate our world of
technology that has developed since the implementation of the Charter and since their decision in
Hunter v Southam. Any new approach to section 8 must be sufficiently robust to protect a wide
range of privacy interests yet provide law enforcement and the courts with sufficiently bright lines
for determining what is and is not private. In chapter 5, I review four possible options for moving
forward in an effort to bring legal certainty to section 8. The first two – maintain the status quo,
adopt the risk analysis – were reviewed but quickly discarded as inappropriate for the development
of the case law. The third option I considered was to employ a spectrum of privacy protection to
address the data available through emerging technologies. This spectrum relies heavily on the
SCC cases of the M(A) and Kang-Brown in the sniffer dog context but is modified and expanded
for technological realities. I outlined three categories for technology based upon intrusiveness,
specificity, accuracy and the type of detail involved in the search. Each category of technology
would have specialized processes and requirements for searches requiring different levels of prior
judicial authorization.

The idea of using a spectrum of protection is nothing new, as is

demonstrated by current legislative provisions. However, creating a spectrum specifically for
technology is useful to provide clarity and predictability.
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The last option proposed in chapter 5 is to move beyond the idea of individual privacy. I
suggest adopting an understanding of privacy as a collective right and outlined how to reimagine
the legal protection of privacy as a social value, primarily through expanded remedies for Charter
breaches. In addition to this expanded view of privacy, I invite the Court to consider the genuine
underlying concerns of section 8 – the freedom to live in dignity without fear of unreasonable
search and seizure. Rather than rely on the current analytical tools with their limitations, the SCC
can draw upon its own Charter jurisprudence and international legal principles to articulate dignity
as the primary consideration in section 8 cases. There are remaining questions regarding this
framework. For example, what normative analytical tools could be developed merits further
elaboration. Whatever route is chosen for section 8 jurisprudence to move forward, the answer
needs to promote predictability.
Searches and seizures of technology will inevitably continue. The borderless nature of
electronic data, together with the fast-paced advancement of technology, means that Canada needs
to find a sufficiently clear approach to section 8 of the Charter as soon as possible. Having an
inadequate body of section 8 jurisprudence leaves Canadian law uncertain on where to draw the
line between lawful and unlawful searches of technology. Perhaps comparative legal research
could assist in defining clear parameters for searches of technology. Further research is necessary
to find ways to achieve international harmonization.
Justice Rowe in Marakah, concurring with the majority, said: “principle and practically
must not be strangers in the application of s. 8 or we might well thwart justice in the course of
seeking to achieve it”.496 With the emerging IoTs and new technologies not yet known, the
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uncertainties prevalent within section 8 jurisprudence will become exacerbated. A section 8
approach based on dignity, prioritizing the prevention of Charter breaches, could provide certainty
in criminal investigations and searches of technology.
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